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INTRODUCTION 
With the steady progress made by labor in private enterprise 
there has developed certain safeguards against arbitrary treatment in the 
matter of removal and lesser discipline$ 
Correspondingly, in the passing of the years, men a.nd women 
in the public service of Massachusetts have been provided vdthvarying 
degrees o~ similar protection from wrongfUl removal or discipline. But 
along ·111 . th the development of purportedly bene:fiee t legislation there 
has been, curiously enough, excesses of protection and complete inade-
quacies both of which have directly affected the character and efficienc,y 
of the ser-vice. 
It is the purpose of thi s thesis t (i) report the methods and 
techniQues the.t hs.ve breen established and adopted for the control o:f 
public personnel in this Connnonwealth and its political subdivisions. This 
corrunences vdth a historical report1 supported and supplemented further by 
an account o:f the actual tecbniques in operation and the kind and chare.cte~ 
of personnel to which each pertain. For this much reliance was placed I 
upon our legislation, departmental records and reports, legislative bills j I 
court decisions and literature of writers in the field of government. TherL~ 
was also extensive and invaluable assistance given by men and women long 
associated ~~th the actual problems of discipline in the different kinds 
o:f personnel groups in the Commonwealth. 
It has been a hope that by offering this portrai t ure of the 
various ways and means of personnel control in this state, an insight 
will be had into the relative effectivenes s and results of each system 
/ 
and, whEt is more important, the likely reasons f or such, to the end 
that one day the ~~sdom of these experiences may better mould the 
techniQue to give us a maximum effic iency in the public service through 
a strong and sound departmental control and a public personnel that is 
shielded from wrong. 
CHAPI'ER 1 
THE POWER OF CONTROL AND DISCHA'RGE BE:H'ORE 1884. 
Prior to the Civil Service reform of 1884 and the resulting 
legislation that followed, the status of the public servant _in his relation-
ship to superiors, department heads or the government, was defined ex-
elusively by the law. The law, moreover, was not the Common law. All 
power of regulation and removal of the servant in the Massachusetts public 
service» whether it be State, Count.1, City of Town, emanated from the 
statutes, ordinances, by-laws or charters. Upon these sources only, 
both employee and management in the governraent service had to rely for a 
definition of who may be punished or removed, upon whom such power rests 
and wha t the disciplinary or removing procedure shall be. See"Bailey ~ 
1 2 
Assessors of Chelsea" citing" Attorney General vs Strattol1"' where the 
Court said: 
"In the cities and towns of Massachusetts, there is no 
power to remove public officers except that which is 
given by too statutes." 
3 And in~ichols vs Commissioner of Public Welfaren the origin of the 
regulating power of state servants as well as those in the lo~~r political 
sub-divisions is explained thus: 
"The legislature has the power to create offices, establish 
their tenure, define the eligibility of those seeking 
such offices, fix their compensation or duties, change 
the tenure and abolish all of such offices other than those 
provided for in the Constitution. And this power is not 
limited to offices intimately connected wi th the state, 
**************~************** 
1. 241/Mass ./411, 413. 
2. 194 ~ass/Bi,53 
3. 311 Mass/125,131. 
1 
"but appli-es to offices that may be created and main-
tained for the aQministration of a branch of municipal 
government in some particular city or toYm. The legis-
lature may also delegate to cities and tovms in further-
ance of the administration of local governmental functions 
the power to create, maintain and abolish offices and to 
regulate and control the official conduct of their 
incumbent s. " 
.And investigation of the legislative sources throughout 
the Conunomrealth in this early period reveals an interesting variety of 
laws providing for regulation and removal. The charter, by-laws and 
ordinances of the cities and towns particularly show us how this phase of 
control was handled within the framework of active government adminis-
tration. 
Some charters and local ordinances provided no rules what-
soever for discipline or removal, while others made sketchy provision. 
In those cities and towns where local ordinance or charters me.de no 
mention of the powers or methods of disciplin,e and removal, the right to 
remove or discipline at pleasure was imulied, i. e. if the executive 
had the power by charter or law to appoint, and since upon him rested the 
responsibility to run the government, he was deemed to have the implied 
power t o remove as a necessary incident to the fulfillment of this res-
ponsibility. And the larger power to remove at will carried with it the 
lesser power to suspend at will. 
I 
Those cities and towns that bad actually expressed them-
selves on the subject show varying degrees of rigidity in the control of 
personnel by the local government or department head. Many local govern-
ments followed the pattern of the Lawrence law which, for example, gave the 
2 
Mayor and Aldermen exclusive power to appoint and the power "to remove at 
pleasure" - seenMurpby vs Webster~ This gave the appointing party the 
absolute power to remove~ or without cause or hearing. Here the 
public employee had his employment only so long as h~ was -w-anted. The 
city , or removing party, was not requi red to give a hearing or have a 
cause. Notwithstanding, many citi es and towns to be fair , or avoid 
criticism from the citizenry did provide the servant with a statement of 
reasons and often with a hearing before action >vas finally taken. To 
repeat, these formalities were not obligator.y by law but were extended for 
npracticaln considerations . 
Many other local governments followed the context of t he 
Boston law which provided removal f or such cause as "they (administrative 
body) may deem sufficient and shall assign. n The interpretation of and 
powers impli,ed in this kind of regulation was explained in"''Dowd vs 
Bostol1', 2 where the Court said: 
"This statute intended removal without a hearing . It 
required only a record to be made of the cause. Sub-
ordinates can be summarily removed without a hearing, 
upon assigning the cause in the order of removal . " 
Here too, as in the communities which would remove nat 
pleasure" , some localit ies gave th~ employee a hearing and a statement ot 
reasons. This was purely optional and not mandatory. Other legislative 
language frequently used by cities and towns and creating absolute power 
1. 131 Mass. 482 
2. 149 Mass . 443 
of removal was often couched in such language as "when best interests of 
town require." 
I n 1899, tv-1enty- .f our y·ears later, however, some restraint and qualification 
was placed by the Massachusetts Supreme Court upon those removing auth-
orities who could remove "for such cause as they deem sufficient and shall 
l 
assign." Explaining such laws in ".Ayers vs Hatch" the Court said that 
this -
"repels the idea of removal at pleasure; cause (expressed 
in these ordinances) implies a reasonable ground for 
removal and not a frivolous or wholly unsatisfactory or 
incompetent ground for removal. If the cause assigned 
is a reasonable one then whether under the circumstances 
it is sufficient to justifY a removal is for the Mayor to 
decide. But whether the cause assigned constitutes of 
itself as a matter of law ground for removal is a question 
for the Court, and a cause for the good of the service is 
a good cause." 
SUch were the governm.ents which retained more or less 
absolute removal control. As time went on, however, more localities 
created or amended their local laws requiring that r ·anoval be for cause. 
Some expressly provided the further formalities of notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard. The latter rights accruing to the civil servant need 
not have been expressed, however, because dismi ssal for cause implied the 
right to notice and an opportunity to be heard. See"Ham. vs Boston Board 
2 
of Police!' 
Hence the first opportunity the public servant had, in the 
absence of express statutory provision, to meet his accusers and disprove 
the complaints against him was created by the judicial interpretation of 
*************************** 
1. 175 Mass. 489, 492. 
2. 142 Mass. 90 . 
4 
the local laws requiring cause as a basis of removal. It not only pro-
vided the implications of a hearing and notice but also review by 
certiorari by the SUpreme Court for any errors of law committed by the 
notice, hearing or decision of the removing body. 
But to those city fathers who felt removal v.-as becoming too 
difficult at this time there was a way out, and that was by the repeal of 
the ordinance itself. This left the public servant completely divested 
of any rights expressed or implied. The repeal virtually ended the employ-
ment if the repealing authorities ¥dshed it. Resort to this method of 
1 
circumvention was only rare, however. See"..ronaghy vs Mac:v". That this 
is constitutional see~raham vs Robertsr 2 
The foregoing variety of local legislation is offered to 
show us substantially the absolute power of removal and suspension retained 
by some public authorities in Massachusetts while other parts of the 
state before 1884 had already developed protective legislation for the 
civil servant. As we leave the period that preceded the civil service 
reform of 1884 it is evident that there was lack of uniformity, that the 
numerous local governments of Massachusetts were completely at difference 
as to the degree of control over discipline and rEIIl.oval to be exercised 
and the extent to which public servants were to have protection against 
arbitrar,y removal or treatment. · 
*************************** 
1. 167 Mass. 178 









Chapter 2o · 
THE DEVELOPlv'IENT OF DISCIPLIN1ill'l PROCEDURES SINCE l884o 
n the deliberations and promulgati:,ns of the "Act to 
I mprove the Civil Service of the Commonwealth" 1 there was little attention 
directed to the question of discharge or discipline. Specifically it cov-
ered only two situations. Section f our of the Act 2 required "immediate 
discharge" of anyone convicted of an offence against the laws of the Com-
:3 
monwealth and section three prevented t he retention in off ice of those 
"habitually using or selling liquor.n Th framers of t he new legislati n 
intended by the clear import of he ct to le~ve control and discipline to 
the authorities and legislative sources t hat dealt with it before. t so 
expressed itse f in le One of the Civil ervice Rules, 1884: 
"The power of appoin~nent and the responsibility of 
selection are in all cases in the appointing officer and 
boardq The power to remove existing by law on t he part 
of any officer or board is not impaired by anything con-
tained in these rules. ~ 
And in 1887, this rule was fu~ended to leave not only the porer of removal 
but also the power to " reduce" with local l egislation. Consistent "?<i. th 
this view was the recommendation o:f the Civi l Service Commissioner in his 
Second Annual Report of 1886, page 18, wh€re speaking about the police he 
suggested " they should be appointed by the Mayor and Aldermen and hold 









It seems strange tllat the uniformity and improvement aimed at by the early 
reformers didn't include legislative action in disciplinary and removal 
control. This has been explained by the fact that the reform group were 
more interested in bringing to the service under a merit e,rstem the best 
talent. And the sentiment prevailed generally that a good merit eysten 
attracting the best and most deserving would lessen the necessity for remove 
laws. In any event the stress and objective was on bui l ding a better public 
service personnel for the actual :functions of government and not on finding 
means to eliminate the undesirous or to provide protective armor to per-
sonnel. For these reasons the :first civil service laws had considered the 
ontrol provided by local legislation to be adequate. 
It was not until the passing of the years that the pressure 
f various groups and forces brought about successive state legislation which 
r adually made inroads on the powers of' the local removing authorities. 
ut in the development there has never been and still is not complete uni-
flormity and coverage of' the public personnel. 
/een disjointed and fragmentary. 
The change in regillation has 
The :first state-wide change to cross the lines of local law 
P,er t ained to veterans. It provided that veterans could not be removed, sus-
nded or transferred from his office or employment except after a full 
earing before the Mayor or Selectmen where he could be represented by 
The law~s primarily designed for the Civil War veterans of 
this period. This retraint on the control of veterans was in force all 
1. Acts and Resolves o:f Massachuset ts, 1894, Chapter 519. 
. .,._ ---· 
7 
through the years that follOYTed and in 1924 it was extended to prevent 
rffinoval or suspension of a veteran, presumably any veteran whether class-
ified or not (State Police, Boston Police and Metropolitan District Com-
mission Police excepted), except for hearing and notice before the State 
Board of Arbitration in the case of a state amployee,and before the 
Selectmen of the tovm for a town employee, and before the City Council in 
the case of a city employee. They were also assured the right to judicial 
review which bad been already established previously in Massachusetts by 
1 
this time. 
In the next year , however, (1925) all legislation that 
2 
pertained particularly to protecting the veteran was repealed. No 
doubt the reason for the repeal Was the fact that enough legislation had 
alrea~ developed in the state to include both veterans and non-veterans 
making unnecessary any particular legislation for veterans. 
After the veterans legislation of 1894 to the time of the 
more general act of 1904, state statutes would place the police or f ire 
forces of a city or town so requesting under the classified service pro-
viding at the same .time that no one shall be removed except for cause, 
hearing, etc. But the provisions for hearing, proof of cause, etc. in 
these cases were usually but the codification of the local ordinances or 
charter context. That is, if the town or city had a particular system for 
the control or removal of the police or f i re forces before coming under 
the classified service, this same method :was usually incorporated in the 
***************************** 
l. Massachusetts Acts and Resolves 1924, Chapter 181. 
2. ACts and Resolves of Massachusetts 1925, Chapt er 220 ~ 
8 
1 
state statute placing the particular services under the classified branch. 
Thus up to 1904, it is clear there was no restraint upon 
the cities and towns other than that which was self imposed by their local 
action. If any connnunity wished to come under the classified service 1 t 
could do so and at the same time decide fp~_}tself who may remove or dis-
cipline, for what causes or for no cause, if it so vdshed. To repeat, 
the Civll Service Law of 1884 did not intend to offer a pattern for uni form 
methods of disciplinary control. 
But in 1904 there appears for the first time a feeling that 
some clear provision must be made for the protection of the classified 
service against improper removal. The necessity for such legislation is 
reflected in the Twentieth .Annual Report (1904) of the Civil Service 
Commissioner, page 12, in his Suggestions of Legislation where he said: 
"That a law be enacted which shall govern removal from. 
office of officers and ~lployees in the classified civil 
service. It was long assumed that in providing for the 
filling of vacancies by appointment from the eligible 
lists after suitable examinations that there would be 
little temptation to remove an officer or employee except 
for good cause. Experience, however, has shown that this 
is not a sufficient safeguard and that there should be 
some legislation on the subject." 
Hence followed in 1904 Chapter 314 of the Massachusetts 
Acts and Resolves, which vvas the first state-wide legislation giving all 
civil service employees protection against removal, suspension, lowering in 
rank except for cause, notice, hearing, et cetera. 
****************************** 
l.Acts and Resolves of Massachusetts, 1901, Chapter 78, and 
Acts and Resolves of Massachusetts, 1900, Chapter 69, Section 3. 
9 
It reads: 
":AN ACTION TO RRGUL.ATE ID:MOVALS AND SUSPENSIONS FROM OFFICE 
AND :EMPLOYMENT IN THE CLASSIFIED CIVIL SERVICE. 
SECTION 1. EVery person holding office or employment 
in the public service of the Commonwealth or in any county, 
city or tovm thereof, classified under the civil service 
rules of the Commonwealth, shall hold such office or 
employment and shall not be removed therefrom, · lowered in 
rank or compensation, or suspended, or, without his consent, 
transferred from such office or emplqyment to any other except 
for just cause and for reasons specifically given in ~Titing. 
SECTION 2. The person sought to be removed, suspended, 
lowered or transferred shall be notified of the proposed action 
and shall be furnished with a copy of the reasons required to 
be given by section one, and shall, if he so requests i n writi~ l 
be given a public hearing·, and be allowed to answer t~e charges I 
preferred against him either personally or by counsel. A copy 
of such reasons, notice and answer and of the order of removal, 
suspension or transfer shall be made a matter of public record." l 
Although this did not provide for judicial review it did purport to provide 
certain safeguards for the classified servant, and for the first time the 
cities and · towns having a classified group were told from above how removal 
and certain phases of discipline were to be conducted. Thereafter their 
absol ute power of control was lost and there followed to the date of this 
writing a series of state enactments regulating disciplinary control which 
were piecemeal and gradual with the Boston Police, Metropolitan District 
Cornmliss i on Police, State Police and Correction employees, county servants, 
and others, reflecting special group interests. 
2 In 1905 the 1904 act was amended to permit suspension up to 
thirty days pending action to be taken under the general provisions ot the 
Act. 
************************ 
1. Massachusetts Acts and Resolves, 1904, Chapter 314, Sections l and 2 
2. Massachusetts Acts and Resolves, 1905, Chapter 243, Section l 
10 
In 1906 it is interesting to note that the police of the cities 
and towns under civil service were given legislation providing for the 
same formalities and safeguards stated in the statute of 1904 for the 
classified service generally. It provided: 
".AN AOI'ION RELATIVE TO R11MOV ALS .A.ND SUSP:ENSIONS FROM OFFICE 
AND EMPLOYMENT OF POLICE OFFIC~RS IN THE CLASSIFIED CIVIL 
SERVICE. 
SECTION 1. EVery police officer now holding or hereafter 
appointed to an office classified under the civil service 
rul~s of the Commonwealth, in any city, and whether appointed 
for a definite or stated term, or othervdse, shall hold such 
office continuously during good behavior, and shall not be 
removed therefrom, lowered in rank or compensation, or suspende , 
or, without his consent, transferred from such office or em-
ployment to any other, except for just cause and for reasons 
specifically given in vTiting by the removing officer or board. 
SECTION 2. The provisions of section tvro of chapter three 
hundred and fourteen of the acts of the year nineteen hundred 
and four, and of acts in amendment thereof, shall apply to 
the police officers designated in section one hereof. 
SECTION 3. This act shall take effect upon its passage." 1 
There seems to be nothing added by this special police latv which the police 
of the ci ties and tov.rns did not s.lready have by virtue of the 1904 legis-
lation~ 2 
It ~~s not considered difficult to procure this law. The 
police lobby and influence v.r~s strong and the fact that at this time the 
nature of their request was very popular, seemingly only asking for a 
drair hearing and discipline for cause, made its passage very easy, so easy 
that the legislators either f'ailed t o noticeits superf'luity or -were more 
interested in submitting to the desires of this strong group, duplication 
or not. 
~************************ 
1. Acts and Resolves of Massachusetts, 1906, Chapt er 210, Sections 1, 2, 3 




And five years later (1911) further proof of the popularity 
of the laws to "protect" the civil servant is revealed in the first enact-
ment of the statute commonly referred to as judicial review. 1 It gave 
all classified workers in the state (Boston Police, Metropolitan District 
Commission Police, District Police, now state police, excepted) the right 
to petition the District Court in their judicial district for a review by 
the Court of the action taken by the· removing board or officer. The Court 
could hear the witnesses, affirm the decision of the removing authority 
unless the decision was made without "proper cause" or in "bad faith." 
T".b.e concept of judicial review vm.s designed to cqrrect some of 
the abuses that arose in the local administration of the 1904 act which, 
though requiring the removing authorities to provide cause and a hearing 
as conditions to removal and discipline, nevertheless left the determination 
of -these conditions to the local officers or boards, many of whom were the 
complainants against the public servant involved. Soon there also arose the 
~eeling by many that the hearing and assignment of cause by those who had 
already concluded a cause against the employee resulted in an empty gesture, 
not fulfilling the real intent of the law which ~~s .to provide protection 
against arbitrary removal or discipline. Local cases also arose wherein 
political and :personal influences dominated the decisions,, raising s erious 
questions as to the good faith of removing personnel. Under this law the:ce 
is no doubt that public officials of questionable virtue could have per-
verted it to serve their :particular ends. So to further insure that the 
*********************** 
1. Acts and Resolves of Massachusetts, 1911, Chapter 624. 
classi:fied s ervant ould be dealt with only for "proper cause" and y men 
of "good f aith" as the law requi red, the leg slature readily responde to t ' e 
proposals that the Court be permitted to review the l ocal action as provide. 
in the 91 act and thu s Massachusetts became k:no'l>\ill as the exponent o 
j u cia review f r dis iplinary removal or suspension of it s publi c ser-
vants. Tha the appeal to the Conrts h s een an attractive law to the 
erring ervant is orne out by the f act that f or three year p riod s nc 
94 seventy nine appea s f rom loca dec sions have een taken to he 
ourts , wh ch t the renk an ile f pu ic emplo}-ment emits o:r 
l 
and is f elt to be a satisfYing determinant o:r j usticew 
he Act o f 19 1 , however, vms not all inclusive~ t speci f call 
excluded the Bost n , etropoli ten Dist rict Coi!lln ss on an State Po ice, "~'~ e 
controlling personnel to the presen day have resisted j udie al revi e'V'I of 
the · r disciplinary "udgments. \Iii th the exception of t ese three organiz-
ations , ho·wever , the great ma j or ty of police i n t he cities and toy.,ns of 
Massachusett s did pprove extending j u icial rev ew to he poll e s and n 
1923 and 19 5 aws were enc.cted giving al · o ice in e civi service , vri 
t e three exceptio 1 e:>etof or e m ntioned; he rig t to ou t review o a c o 
y r e. oving aut ori ies nC. f or su tantial ly the smne reasons .- ich 
pired the creation o:r the or gin review act . 
. i 1923 nd 
8 ·ion is t he present stctus of the law s now set forth in b ter 3 .• 
Annotate ws of assach~se ·o, section 42A an 42 
"42 • ery po ce of i er ho i 
the civil service ru es , n ny 
an 
****** ********** ***** 
o:r ction was 





"town whether for a definite or stated term or otherwise , shall 
hold such office cont i nuously during good behavior and shall not 
be removed nor , except as otherwi se provided herein, be suspende 
or, without hi s consent , be transferred from such office, nor sh 11 
he be l ower ed- in rank or compensation nor shall his office be a ol-
1 ished, except after a full hearing of which he shall bve at leas 
seveny-two hours' written notice, with a statement of the reasonw 
for the contemplated removal , suspension, transfer, lowering in f ank 
or compensation, or abol i tion of office , and except upon a ~~itt n 
order stating fUlly and specifically the causes therefor made af er 
a hearing as aforesaid and signed by the board or officer before whom 
the hearing is held. Such a police officer may, b.o1'rever, be tem:wor-
arily suspended without su~ notice when necessar,y as a matter o 
police discipline, but only for just cause and for reasons spe-
ci fically given him in ~Titing within twenty-four hours after 
such suspension. If within three days thereafterthe police I 
officer so suspended shall so request in writing he shall 
be given a public hearing in not less than three nor more than j 
f ourteen days after the filing of the reo_uest. Any hearing undet' 
thi s section shall, if the pol ice officer so requests in ~Titing ll 
be public and shall be held before the officer or board having 
power of appointment and removal. .Any· such hearing may be con-
t inued from time t o time, if said board or officer and the 
police officer concerned agree thereto . At any such hearing 
charges shall be made by the officer in command of the depart-
ment or of the district where the poli ce officer is on duty or 
by any person designated by the offi cial in command of the 
department, and the poli ce officer concerned shall be allowed 
to answer the charges preferred against him, either personally or 
by counsel. Sai d police offi cer shall be notified in ~Titing 
~nthin three days after the hearing, of the decision at such 
hearing . A copy of the reasons , notice and answers and of the 
order of removal , suspensi on, transfer, low«ring in rank or 
compensation, or abolition of office shall be made a matter of 
public record. 
42B. Within thirty days after a hearing provided for by the 
preceding section, the police officer who was removed, suspended 
transferred, or lowered in r ank or compensation, or ·whose 
office was aboli shed, may bring a petition in the district 
court of the judicial district where such police officer 
resides, addressed t o the justice of the court, praying that 
the action of the officer or board in removing, suspending or 
transferring him, or lowering him ~n rank or compensation, or 
abolishing his office, may be reviewed by the court, and after 
such notice to such officer or board as the court deems necess~ 
it shall review such action, hear any or all of the witnesses 
and determine whether or not upon all the evidence such action 
was justified, the decision at the hearing shall be affirmed; 
otherwise it sl:lall be reversed and the petitioner shall be 
reinstated in his office ~~thout loss of compensation. The 
decision of the court shall be final and conclusive upon tb.e 
And the 1911 act giving judicial review generally is now represented by 
Chapter 31, .Annotated Laws o'f Massachusetts, sections 43 and 45, which 
provide: 
~43. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, ever,r person 
holding o'ffice or empl~Jnent in the classi'fied public service 
o'f the commonwealth, or o'f any county, city or town thereof, 
shall hold such o'ffice or employment and shall not be removed 
therefrom, lowered in rank or compensation or suspended, or 
~thout his consent transferred from such o'ffice or employ-
ment to any other, except for just cause, and for reasons 
speci'fically given him in writing within twenty-four hours 
after such removal, suspension, transfer or lowering in rank 
or compensation. 
If within three days thereafter, the person sought to be 
removed, suspended, lowered or transferred shall so request 
in writing, he shall be given a public hearing in not less 
than three nor more than 'fourteen days after the filing of the 
request, by the officer or board whose action affected him 
as aforesaid, and he shall be allowed to answer the charges 
preferred against him, either personally or by counsel, and 
shall be notified, in writing within three days after the 
hearing, of the decision of such of'ficer or board. In derault 
of such hearing, said person shall forthvTith be reinstated. 
A copy of said reasons, notice, answer and decision shall be 
made a matter of public record in the department." 
"45. Within thirty days after the hearing provided for in 
section forty-three or after action under section forty-six, 
the person so removed, transferred or lowered in rank or com-
pensation, or suspended, or whose office or position is 
abolished, except members o'f the police department of Boston, 
the police or the metropolitan district commission and the 
state police, may bring a petition in the district court o'f 
the judicial district where such person resides, addressed 
to the justice or the court, praying that the action o'f the 
off.icer or board m~ be reviewed by the court, and after such 
notice to such o'f:t'icer or board as the court deems necessary, 
it shall review such action, hear the v.i.tnesses, and shall 
a'ffirm the decision of the o'fficer or board unless it shall 
appear that it was made without proper cause or in bad faith, 
in which case said decision shall be reversed and the petitioner 
be reinstated in his office R~thout loss or compensation. The 
decision of the court shall be final and conclusive upon the 
parties." 
Hence today, all classified servants . in Massachusetts, ~i.th exceptions 
15 
stated, are heavily enveloped with strong protective armor all the ~~y from 
rights to a hearing, specific notice of reasons, proof of cause, precise 
time r~strictions, and finally judicial review of all action ~aken. With-
out di s cussing at this juncture the wisdom or failings of the Massachusetts 
Concept, it has definitely had a strong appeal to employee group interests 
then and today, v.i.th the right to Court review having a particularly strong 
appeal to employees. 
In 1925, it was quickly adopted by the prison employees in the 
Massacbusetts Department of Correction without regard to whether they were 
l 
classified or not. This legislation provides: 
"46. An officer or employee of the state prison, of the 
reformatory for women, of the prison camp and hospital, of the 
state prison colony, or of the Massachusetts reformatory, 
sought to be removed, suspended, lowered in rank or compen-
sation, or transferred, shall be notified of the proposed 
action, and shall be furnished a copy of the reasons therefor 
as required by section forty-three» and shall, if he so 
requests i n ~~iting, be given a hearing before the commissi oner 
of correction and be allowed to answer any charges preferred 
against him, either personally or by counsel. Said commissione ., 
after hearing the officer preferring the charges, and the offi c r 
or employee in question, together with such witnesses as either 
of the parties may produce, shall determine whether or not the 
reasons for such proposed removal, suspension, lowering in 
rank or compensation, or transfer, are just and sufficient, and 
shall certi f.y his finding to the head of the institution i n 
which such officer or employee is employed, who shall, if the 
reasons given have been sustained by the finding, forth~~th 
remove from office or employment, suspend , lower in rank or 
compensation, or transfer the officer or employee in ~uestion , 
subject to the right of judicial review provided by the pre-
ceding section. If said commis s i oner finds that such reasons 
are not just and suffici ent, t he head of the institut i on i n 
which the officer or employe e is employed shall continue him 
in servi ce or, if he has temporarily been suspended, shall 
forthwith r estore him t o duty or to his original rank or 
"******************* 
220, Sec . 4, now 
46 . (The institutions re= 
All ot hers are - See ecords ~~~~~~~~~----~~~------~~ Correction , State House, o t. on , Mass. See al so 1941 amendment , now the 
Ailllotated Laws of 1944, Chapt er 31, sec. 46 , which presently provi de s t hat 
only those i n the classi f ied servi ce in the Depar tment of Correction are 
entitled to a hearing and judicial review. 
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compensation, as the case may be . A copy of the reasons, 
notice, answer, finding, and order of removal, suspension, 
lowering in rank or compensation, or transfer, shall , i n each 
case, be f iled in the office of the division and made a matter 
of public record." ' 
And at the present ti111e all groups pt'eviously mentioned as not within the 
benefits of judicial review heretofore enacted now seek the passage of laws 
1 
designed to give t hem also a court r evie-;r of adtllinistrative act ion. 
Th-ere is also House Bill No. 1)~~6, 1945, whichJ1'oposes that no 
action be permitted against a public servant in the classified sarvice by 
any administrative official or board, that tha matter be heard .directly 
by the Di strict Court if the employee so chooses. The Bill sets forth: 
"AN ACJr RELATIVE TO REMOVALS UNDE..."R THE CIVIL SERVICE LAVJ. 
Chapter thirty-one of the General Laws is hereby amended 
by inserting aft er section f orty-three, as appearing in the 
Tercentenary Edition, the following new section:-
Section 43A. An officer or employee of any city or town 
holding office or employment i n the classifi~d public service, 
who shall be entitled under section forty-two B or sect ion 
fol~y-three to a public hearing before an aaministrative 
authority on any action taken by it may, by v~itten notice to 
such authority given 1tithin the time l imited f or claiming such 
hearing, elect to di spense vdth such hearing and to claim a 
judicial hearing thereon. Such officer or employee, within ten 
days after giving notice of election as aforesaid, shall f ile 
a petition in the district court of the judicial district 
wherein he is employed, addressed to the justice of the court 
and praying for a judicial determination of the sufficiency and 
j ustice of the action of such authority. After such notice 
as the justice may order and not earlier than f ourteen days 
after the filing of the pet ition, he shall hold a hearing on 
such action, at whi ch ev:id.ance may be presented by both parties. 
Such authority shall furnish to the justice and to such officer 
or emplqyee, at l east ten days prior to the date set for the 
hearing a copy of the charges or reasons for such action, and 
****************""***'k""**"~""*** 
1. Massachusetts HOuse Bills No . 558 and 341 of 1945 , proposing court 
review for the Boston Police; House Document No . 1675 of 1945; 
Report of the Special Reces s Commission Studying Civil Servi ce Laws, 
page 5, recommending that th·e Boston, Metropolitan District Cormnission 
and state Police be given Court review on action taken by an appointing 
authority . 
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such off icer or employee shall furnish to the justice and to 
such authority, at least seven days prior to said date, a copy 
of his answers to said charges or reasons. The hearing may be 
continued from time to time. If, after such hearing, the justic 
finds, upon all the evidence, that such action was justified, I 
he shall affirm it, and the same shall stand. If he f inds other 
~~se, such authority shall thereupon rescind such action vnthout 
loss of compensation or other prejudice to such officer or 
employee and shall take su h further action, if any, as may be 
necessary to conform to th finding of the justice. The decisio 
of the court shall be fina and conclusive upon the parties." 
Even the teachers in Massachusetts ar asking for Court review of the 
1 
accorded much finali ty. 
Representatives of the vet rans group , moreover, have presented 
HOuse Bill 628 which seeks to assure he unclassified veterans in the publi 
service of all the safeguards against removal or suspension and rights to I 
Court review had by the classified pe sonnel of Massachusetts. 
".AN .ACJr REGULATING THE SEP!illATION FROM PUBLIC SERVICE OF WAR 
VEI'ERANS. 
SECTION L A veteran, s defined in section twenty-one of 
chapter thirty-one of the eneral Laws, as amended, or 
sections fifty-six to si of chapter thirty-two as amended, 
who has heen serving for period of at least one year in any 
office or position in the service of the corononwealth, or any 
political sub-division, e ept one holding an office or 
position classified under hapter thirty-one of the General 
Laws, or a teacher or publ c school superintendent serving 
under the provisions of se1ction forty-one of chapter seventy-one 
of the General Laws, or one holding an elective office in the 
commonwealth or any political subdivision, or one appointed for 
a fixed term, or one holding an office or position under the pro-
visions of section seven of chapter thirty of the General Laws, 
shall not be separated from the service of the commonwealth or 
any political subdivision except for reasons identical with 
those relating to the separation from se1~ice of a person 
holding an office or position classified under chapter thirty-on 
of the General Laws and only after such separation has been 
************li--'******** ' 
l. BOuse Bill 718 of 1945, p. 8~ 
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effected, throt~h a procedure identical with that n~essa~· to 
separat e from service a person holding an office o r position 
classified under chapter thirty-one of the General Laws8 " 1 
The pro-employee trend in legislation would not be complete 
without also mentioning the post-disciplinary privileges ac corded t he 
classified civil servant in our state9 By this is meant the opportunity 
afforded him a f ter hts discharge or suspension f or cause to- a ply f or a 
hearing bef ore the Direc or of Civil Service , who may aut rize is rein-
statement . The statute recites: 
"46C. An officer or employee of the commonwealth or of a city 
o~ to~u who has ecome separated f rom the classified civil 
servi ce through f aul t or delinqui ncy of hi s own sha , within 
thirty days aft er the filing of a written request by the appoint-
i ng officer~ b e entitled to a hearing bef ore the director . Upon 
good cause shown the director may, subject to section f orty-six 
G, authorize his reinstatement in the same position or in a 
position in the same class and grade as that f ormerly he d by 
him." 2 
.And s imilar y for the Metropoli t an istrict Commission see: 
"46F~ A member of the police force of the metropol itan district 
commission who has become separated from the class ifi ed c i v i 
service y suspension ~ di&charge or for any other cause , except 
i nabili ty to wor k on account of sickness , shall, ~~thin t hirty 
day s aft er the f iling of a written request by said commi ssion , 
be entitled to a hearing before the director . Upon good cause 
sho-wn the di r ector may authorize hi s reinstatement i n t he Sctllle 
position as t hat f ormerly held by him." 3 
.Although the foregoing legislation requires the appointing 
offi cer to take t he i nitiative for the discharged or suspended employee , 
which off hand, would seem to be an assurEnce by the one in the best 
** **************** 
House Bill 628 of 1945, p~ pp. 1, 2w 
2. Annotated Laws of Massa chus~, Chapter 31 5 Sec. 46C. 




position to know, that the reinstatement sought is deserving or meri-
torious , yet in actual :practice appointing officials are often coerced to 
request hearings under heavy political pressure exerted in behalf of the 
former servant . The safeguards against this pressure is the fact, how-
l 
ever, that the last word rests with the Commi ssioner. It is wholly up 
to him whether re-instatement is justified. Legally there is no restric-
tion on the number of times a discharged or disciplined servant can apply 
for re-instatement. In practice the succeeding Commissioners fol low a 
five year policy, i. e. re-instatements are not granted after five ~ears 
from the date of discipline or removal. l~at determines re-instat~~ent 
depends upon the individual case, and the particular pos i tion the appli-
cant i s in~ In the drinking cases a laborer, for example, would have a 
far better chance to be re-instated than a uni formed servant. Drunkenness 
by one engaged in labor would not be regarded a bar to re-instat~nent as 
in the case of drinking by a policeman who carries weapons and must be 
alert in the case of emergencies9 On the other hand not all in unifo~~ 
are measured the same way. There is the individual approach. A fireman 
who, though held to a much stricter standard than the laborer, would not 
be gauged by the same rule used in a policeman's case. No one set of 
rules are deci sive . Each applicant is considered separately and the 
Cormni ssi·1ner' s decision rests upon the nature of the offence, the job 
held, the appl i cant's personal and occupational history, along with his 
behavior since the separation from service. The Commissioner reacts in 
several ~~s. He may re-instate, refuse to do so, or if there is doubt, 
he will consult with the applicant and tell him to return after six 
months or longer and if his behavior indicates a particular standard, 
anQ vhe Comnnss· oner lS n w 
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favorable action may follow. 
On the average about fifty percent of those applying are re-
1 
instated. For the years of 1943 and 1944, ninety-three were re-instatede 
This large percentage of re- ·!!statements shows further the trend to pro-
employee sentiment. 
But the law, if not perverted, does provide a means of reward 
and chance to those that had made a mistake and whose history since :may 
have warranted another opportu.ni ty to contribute worthwhile talent to the 
government service • 
.And finally, there are also proposed amendments to post dis-
ciplinary laws which are designed to lean still further to employee 
benefits. House Bill No. 900 of 1945 proposes an amendment to Chapter 
31, Section 46C and seeks to establish an automatic reinstatement o~ sus-
pended servants after the suspension period expires and which would make 
unnecessary a request for reinstatement by the appointing official as 
required in section 46C. 
This proposal is not without force. Under 46C the penalized 
employee is compelled to suffer a longer suspension than that originally 
given because of the expiration of time resulting from administrative 
detail required to effect the reinstatement after having served his period 
of suspension. Section 46C, moreover, seems to require the fulfillment 
of this procedure as a condition to reinstatement after suspension. It 
would seem that this proposal does correct a defect in the post-
disciplinary legislation, when it seeks to prevent the imposition of a 
****************"'* 




longer suspension than originally decreed. 
Thus we find that the afuninistrative disciplinary control ove 
civil s e:rvants in Massachunetts which started ~i.th a more or less abso-
lute power as late as 1903 has gradually diminished giving ·way to more 
and more restriction, Court reviews, and Inore latelyj a suggestion of com= 
plste optional elimination of administrative control in matters of removal, 
suspension and discipline. 
The pendulum having now svrung so far from departmental contro , 
many now hold the view that less restriction should be placed on department 
prerogative and that the extensive protective legislation enjoyed by the 
l 
employee has resulted in injury to the public service. 
As early as 1924~ Civil Service authorities in Massachunsetts 
recognized the dangers to the heavily protective legislation and in the 
Annual Report of 1924 of the Civil Service Commissioner at page ten, he 
contends: 
~A recognized weakness in the · present civil service law of 
Massachusetts relates to discharge of employees. Under the 
existing system no employee can be discharged except for the 
most serious offence. Employees who would be promptly dis-
22 
charged from private employment for incompetency and ineffici cy 
continue to hold their position in the Public Service indefin ely. 
The Connuissioner t heref ore r ecommends a new discharge law for 
all Civil Service employees . " 
Whatever the opposing views be, it is certain that assachuse s 
he.s gone a long way f'or the public servant since the day of its earlier 
sentiment manifested in 1904 when the Civil Service Commisshmer felt the 
2 
need for a removal law beaause of the "insufficient safeguard. " 
****************** 
1. "Lens" Februar-.1- ~arch ed. 1945. Published by the Massachunsetts . Civic 
LeagUe, Boston, Mass. (No page numbers, see under capt ion of "Public S:lrvi e O::>nunittec") 
Introduction to American Gove~ment, Frederick A~ Ogg, P. Orman Ray , ~. _0,441 
Public Personnel .Administration, Mosher and Kingsley, pp. _345 
The Federal Service - Levds Mayers, pp. 492, 501, 502. 
2. of the Massachunsetts Civil Service Commissioner~,l904 p. 12 
Furthermore, our stete has recorded its inten·-t t o enforce strict 
compliance of all aspects of its removal laws upon appointing or depart-
mental authorities. As early as 1919 the SUpreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts ruled in 'Stiles vs Municipal Counoil of Lowell" 1 that removing 
authorities were personally liable in damages to the classified servant if 
the statute wa s not complied vnth pllor to removal and the servant was thus 
unlawf'ully removed. This liability in tort prevailed even though the 
removing authorities may have acted in good faith. The Court declared at 
page 182: 
"the incumbent of an office carrying emolument has rights 
protected from assault by third persons." 
That our Court intends to go far in the ·preservation of these 
2 
"rights" is revealed very forcefully i n "Ashton vs Wolstenholmd' where a 
department head was held personally liable in damages for failing to restor 
I 
a classified servant to his former grade though the demotion was done £[ 
• his ;predecessor in office and though the present departmental superior~ 
no time acted in bad faith • 
. As benefi ~e ·~ , however, as the Massachusetts Courts and legis-
lation have been to its civil servants, not all public service of this 
state has enjoyed the benefits extended the classified service. There 
exists two groups, broadly speaking, who have · comparatively lit tle pro-
tective legislation; namely certain unclassified civil servants and those 
i n their probationary period in civil service. For the latter see 
********************* 
1. 223 Mass. 174 
2. 243 Mass. 193 
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. 1 
tMcDonald vs Fire Engineers of Clinton"' These unsheltered and unclas-
sified servants are employed in the state and all its political sub-
divisions. .2 The state alone normally employs eleven thousand five hundred. 
In addition, it is estimated there are approximately seventy-
five hundred unclassified public employees in the cities and towns, or 
roughly fifteen percent of the total fifty thousand in the cities and 
towns who are classified. 
But let us turn to the county governments whose employees are 
not classified within the civil service rules and whom the writer offers, 
with some reservation, as a characteristic stuQy of the unclassified 
vrorker in Massachusetts in the setting of little protection against 
removal or discipline. 
*********************** 
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• THE COUNTY GOVERNMENTS. 
About four thousand people are employed throughout the four-
teen counties of Massachusetts. The county personnel are not classified. 
For years forces within the county have successfUlly resisted attempts 
to place them under civil service. With the exception of those who have 
been in the county service for a period of time and are under the retire-
ment s.ystem, this group of public ~ervants have no legislation which the,y 
can invoke in the event their removal or suspension is sought. :Em.ploy-
ment in the county gover.ru~ent of Massachusetts is essentially at the will 
and pleasure of the hiring authorities. 1 They are not likely to I 
have as much protection as the unclassified workers in the cities and town 
because the city and tov.n employees, though not classified, often receive 
some measure of protection from individual ordinances or charter law that 
has been on the books for years or from laws that have been created anew ,1 
or amended to provide the usual requirements of proof of cause, notice, 
hearing, et cetera, as conditions to dismissal or discipline of these 
groups. 
Much of the character, moreover , that attaches to county 
employment is political, being the result of the structural composition 
of the county government. It consists chiefly of the Clerk of Courts, 
County Commissioners, the Register of Probate, the Register of Deeds, the 
District Attorne.y, County Sheriff, County Treasurer, all of whom are elect d 
for a term by the people. The officers so elected to these offices have 
********************** 
1. Report of Boston Municipal Research Bureau, Nov. 27, 1940, p. 11 
absolute power of appointment and dismissal and it is known from common 
expc:rience that commitments are made to supporters in campaigns which are 
often fulfilled by the elLmination of previous personnel regardless of 
their competency and replaced by friends or political adherents. This is 
confirmed by the findings ·o:r Mr. Richard A. Atkins , secretary f the Boston 
Municipal Research Bur eau , and an active student of Massachusetts County 
Govern.ment, and who found: 
nrt is not unfair to state that the county service throughout 
Massachusetts has been and is a source of patron~e - not 
the least of personal patronage and nepotism.n 1 
Such is the atmosphere the county servant works in. In the 
light of the extensive legislation protecting the classified servant in 
our state, his status appears completely barren or such. To determine 
the average life or county employment with such lack or protection, 
accurate data is not available to indicate the rate or personnel turn-
over from time to t .ime. But it is knoV~n that on several occasions new 
appointments of heads of county institutions by the new political 
incumbents were followed by a complete ousting of considerab.le numbers of 
former employees, some of long standing and meritorious service. Against 
this apparently the county servant is defenceless. 
And if county departmental authorities can remove from the 
service of the county, the lesser power of suspension or discipline 
follows by implication. To this absolute power of removal there i s one 
exception. That is the public employees of the cities, towns, counties 
and ste.t e in the retirement system. Under Chapter 32, Sec. 37C 
********************* 
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of the Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, the public servant of the city, 
town, county or state in the retirement system, whether classified or not, 
has a right to a hearing before the local city, town, county or state 
Retirement Board in the event his removal is sought. In effect, he can 
be retired or removed only upon proof that it would be "for the good of 
the service" or for "moral turpitude" and the servant,like the classified 
I 
group , has the rie;ht to Court review to determine if the action of the 
Retirement Board ~~s justified. But this protection inures to the benefit 
of only those unclassified workers who, under thi s statute, have "completed 
twenty or more creditable years and are under age sixty, or have completed 
1 
fifteen or more creditable years and are over age sixty." Hence a. 
large nQmber of county and other unclassified personnel are not aided by 
this statute . It should also be pointed out that the language of the 
statute is broad. To date no decisions of the Courts have interpreted 
"for the good of tha service" within the meaning of this statute, but it 
would seem to invest removing authorities with a broad lattitude of dis-
cretion in the determination of reasons, thus leaving even this privileged 
group with a minimum of protection within the strict contemplation of law. 
But its effect psychologically upon the departmental and political heads 
in the County govermnent is noticeable. The large majority of them 
associate the long term employments vd th permanency and untouchability as 
a result of the hearings and Court reviews afforded by the state. There 
ia a ~~rther reluctance to proceed where hearings and reviews are provided 
becau3e of the fear of disclosures that may be unfavourable to politicians 
********************** 
1. Massachusetts Annotated Laws, Chap. 32 Sec. 3 C ss. 1 and 2 
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or others in county or office affairs. · These are some of the factors 
tending to lessen the discharges of older employees~ Only t wo, for exampl , 
have ever occurred in Essex County in all the years. And doubtless it 
helps to account for the current pressure on and deliberations of the Mas- 1 
~c:. chusetts legislature to bring those only ten years in the service 
v.rithin the hearing and Court review benefits of the act as eJ~.-tended now 
1 
to the older employees. 
But v.ri th the exception of this older group, the county servant 
does at times feel the necessity . of being politically "safe" from t ime 
to time. Many political heads and even employees of the county govern-
ment refute the perennial assertions of "politics" in their employment 
by pointing to the paucity of numbers in personnel turnover. This fact 
of little personnel turnover is true. But 1trhether the reasons for such is 
rooted in a meritorious policy of county political heads to revmrd efficieJ t 
II 
talent with undisturbed tenure is open to question. Mr. Atkins points . 1/ 
out t hat: 
"EVidence pointing to unusual turnover among county 
employees is not present~ One stablizing influence has 
probably been the absence of important p olitical changes in 
the counties . ft 2 
There for e , consideration must be given to the fact that success ive coun~ 
administrations, totalling fourteen, with t 'he exception of two, are most 
always Republican in majority control and have been within the lifetime 
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party pref ere ce e.lread in the ma j ority would be more L. ely t o r emain 
wi .h l ess turnover than would be the likeliness if the opposite party 
preva ed . Furtlermore ~ not all o itical heads in county government 
pose apo ogies or deny the essence of things.. Some are f rank to con ess 
th t t he r eturn f or political support must be patronage within the 
ordinary concep of t he Spoils qystem a d t et tlus patron ·e extends t o 
. placing f riends even i n pos t. ons well s erve by others ; t hat s ·ch v ew 
have been extenSive y execut ed an t hrtt t llere i s the likeliness of a 
predominance of ftpolitics" in county em loyment seems a ff irmed y the repor~ 
of Robert T.. Buslmel , Attorney General f or t e Commo -eel t of assach ',.,-
e:etts , shov:_ng the poli ti ca moti f in county administration. In its dis~ 
cussions of ma administrat i on i ccun over~ment it relates: 
"these i ndictments (against the County Cormuissioners f or l arceny 
of county property) by no means cover the rami f cation of mal-
administration in Bristol County~ Obvious limitation of time 
prevented prosecution of all participe.nts in the scheme in 
which ten percent of the fund s paid out of the county treasury 
each month i n t he conduct of the busi ness of the ounty w s 
turned back into a fund for politica l campaign purposes and f or 
l ater di vi sion among the participants ~" 1 
An even greater evil inherent in t he unprotected and political 
charact er of county employment wss revealed in t he scandalous job s ellin 
and money exactions f r om sc:r- b-wome in he service of Suffolk oun~y- in 
939. Here thousands of dollars were paid by county scrub-women to the 
coun y sher ff in order t o both pr oc re and retain thei r j obs. There were 
other county ' obs similarly s ld by t e unscrupulous pol itician ·with t enur 
contingent upon periodi . paj ents to the political head. 












"MOVE TO FRIGBTEN liTTNESSJJ:S REPORTED 
VICTIMS P.AID UP TO $200 
EX-SHERIFF SOUGHT HERE 
Evidence that a wom~ a'ided members of the 
"shakedown" ring, which it is alleged, E)perated 
in Suffolk County during J" ohn F. DoVI-d' s regime as 
Sheriff, and obtained about $3700 from women 
cleaners at the Pemberton sq. courthouse, is in the 
hands of Dist. Atty. William J. Foley, it was learned 
last night. 
The evidence, it was also learned, involved still 
another woman, who on Thursday night it is claimed, 
told cleaning women, waiting to be q_uest ioned by 
George E. McGunigle of the district attorney's staff, 
that if they "talked" they would lose their jobs. 
$150 to $200 Paid for Jobs 
The women ·who testified yesterday were •••• 
• • • both of whom told that they paid ~200 apiece 
to get their jobs • • • • • • P~other person 
questioned y-esterday vms Albert Kramer, a guard at 
the Charles st. J"ail, who told Asst. Dist. Atty. 
Doyle that he paid $2000 for a court officer's job 
but ended as a jail officer. • " 1 
Another report is as follows: 
"DOVm INDICTED, SOUGin' BY POLICE 
$18, 000 GRAliT AND CONSPIRACY P.RE 
CHARGED 
List of Counts. 
The 32 counts of requesting and accepting 
gratuities were listed by the indictment as fol-
lows, all from uourthouse or jail employees: 
Robert W. Gunning $300 
Andrew J. Karklin $500 
***************** 
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"John J~ Moulton 
John J. Thompson 
Joseph ·whippen 
John J. Freeman 
Cornelius F. Murpby 
Morgan Molloy 
Thomas P. R.. Walsh 
John A. Lane 
Willi81Il. Forbes 
William F. Glynn 
Patrick J. Norton 
Earl N. Weitzel 
J ohn H. McDonough 
Joseph E. Devnine 
Jacob Oselin 
Francis Friary 
Franci s B. Greer 
Daniel J. Lamey 
Chales C. O'Neil 
Caspar Zimmerman 




Timothy F. McCarth6 
Bartholomew P. Bowen 
Edmond J. Martin 
Phillip Hami lton 
Joseph Kram 
Michael D. Ma rtin 
































"SCRUBW01VCEN P..A..ID DOWD $200 EACH FOR COUNTY JOBS 
Former Sherif'f' J ohn F. Dowd' s known income from the 
sale of' jobs in SUf'folk county jumped $5200 more last 
night when 26 scrubwomen at the courthouse • ho earn 
$18 weekly, told Dist . Atty . William J. Fole,y each paid 
$200 t o the :f~:r.mer of:ficie.l .; now sought on a total of 
49 counts of bribery i ndictments. • • • • • • • 
Cramming about i50,000 of the $90,000 he is charged 
with receiving from the job sales and e~tortion from 
permanent employees of the courthouse and the Charles 
street jail into a bag and then packing a suitcase, 
****************** 
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"Dowd, accompanied by Mrs. Dowd, hurried ~rom the 
home o~ his ~Q~e's uncle in Milton last Monday, police 
learned. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 
As more and more SU~~olk: county employees told 
o~ paying substantial sums to Dowd and 17 additional in-
dictments revealed deputy sheri~~s paid in the ~our 
figures to hold t heir l ucrative positions under Dowd, 
authorities predicted the amount which went to the ~ormer 
sheriff would exceed $100,000. 
One of the new indictments returned by the grand 
jury yesterd~ charged Dowd accepted $6900 ~rom Deputy 
Sheriff Daniel J. Whelton. This was in connection with 
the amounts Dowd withdrew from the deputy sheriff's 
pool which averages about $100,000 a year ~or the service 
of writs in the county. 
Deputy John J. Casey gave him $2500, Deputy GeOrge 
E. Hibbard $1000 and Michael Picardi $700, according to 
the indictments • • • • • • • • • • • 
The 26 scrubwomen, whom Dowd had classified as 
"supervising ladies" told the district attorne,y they 
were put to work by Dov.rd within a short time a~ter 
paying him the money. Some were allowed to pay the 
$200 in monthly installments, although most of them 
said Dowd's go-between told them to go out and borrow 
the money explaining that neither he nor the sherif~ 
could be bothered with the bookkeeping •••••••• " 1 
And not only does "politics" loom large in the procurement. and 
retention of employment but also in the County servant's incapacity to 
act collectively and openly in the correcti on of the weaknesses. It is 
quite true that fear o~ incurring the displeasure of the poli tical heads 
in the county has been a potent silencer of personnel. In the great 
majority of the counties the p6litical and departmental heads. have tra-
ditionally opposed any change in the patronage system and employment at 
will. Their resistance to such reforms as civil service has been strong. 
This has made agitation for re~orm,particularly civil service, by the 
count.Y employees very difficult and marked with restraint. 
********************** 
1. Boston Herald, November 24, 1939. 
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But it vrould not be accurate, however, to s~ that the personal 
intervention of the politicians is the only force which has prevented 
reform. The lassitude ·and indifference rooted in physical fe_ctors and in 
old entrenched methods of this ancient type of government have also been 
retarding factors9 Here again Mr . Atkins explains these forces in more 
detail : : _ 
"Among the practical considerations which have hindered 
greater personnel progress in the counties are- (1) political 
strength of county officials and their unwillingness to see 
their o~n prerogatives impaired; (2) weight of tradition 
upon a unit of goverament whieh has changed relatively little 
since the colonie.! p.eriod; (·3) the unfamiliarity of county 
officials with broad problems o~ personnel administration and 
their narrow outlook beyond the confines of their re.gular 
duties; (4) the smallness of the counties and of their 
individual county departments which makes personnel administra-
tion more amenable to unsystematic methods; · (5) the absence 
of centralized executive authority in the counties which might 
be expected t o impose unifor.m rules and secure uniform results. 
But each year someone has managed to have bills before the 
Massachusetts Legislature requesting the classified status under civil 
2 
service. Prominent non-partisan organizations in the Commonwealth 
such as the Massachusetts Federation of Taxpayers Association, the Massa-
chusetts CiT.ic Leagus, the American Federation of State, County and 
Municipal Employees have supported the movement and bills for civil servic Q 
Thus far, however, the strength of the Republican party in the counties, 
their Republican affiliations in the legislature, the fear of open action 
the employees have all been strong factors contributing to the failure of 
reform. However, the movement is growing both within the ranks of the 
******"'*************** 
1 
l. Certain Aspects of Coun&r Personnel Administration in Massachusetts, p. 9 




county employees and beyond it. Mr. George M. Cook, a J?rominent advo-
cate of county reform, makes an interesting commentary on the county 
movement. Mr. Cook relates: 
"But in the counties it is another matter. Since 1911 when 
theu first threatened, county officials have successfully 
evaded regulation by civil service. Not until 1941 has 
there been another serious attack on their 'splendid isolation' 
But the current legislature is unusually sympathetic to the 
merit system. It has even considered a bill filed by the 
Massachusetts Federation of Taxpayers Association which would 
put all county officials under civil service and discharge 
those who could not prove their qualifications by examination 
••••••• it failed of approval by only one vote but vres 
revived • • • • • • • and vigorously debated. The county 
commissioners sought to soften it; the county clerks and the~ 
fellow in misery were all in the state Hojse with tears in 
their eyes. The,y were saved once more." 
But that they \ld.ll be saved "once more" is becoming more 
doubtfUl primarily due to the fact that county personnel themselves now 
openly seek civil service whereas in the past, for fear of reprisal, 
they had to rely upon outside organizations to work for them, which left 
legislators uncertain as to whether the civil service status is or is 
not the majority sentiment of this group~ Today , however, the.y speak 
2 
directly for themselves. And this fact that their sentiments can-
not now be mistaken is considered by many to be a strong indication that 
legislature \rlll comply. 
Thus we conclude v.ri. th the county employee as he is on the 
threshhold of reform. That refonn is necessa.ry,particularly as security 
against unfair arbitra1y removal or treatment,would seem clear. However, 
*********************** 
l. The .Massachusetts Civil Service system at p. 28 
2. Ebuse Bill 707 of 1945, emanating from the Massachusetts State 
Council of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal 
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the ~~iter reserves for the concluding phase of this paper the discussion 
of forces affecting the public service as a consequence of ill-protected 
or politically controlled public servants. 
So far we have dealt With the civil servant in Massachusetts 
in the two extremes. On the one side we have the public servant well 
enshrouded in defensive legislation all the way through the courts. On 
the other side is the county servant who has no protection at all (those 
in the older employ.ment and under the retirement system excepted). In 
between these opposites there is left in Massachusetts three other public 
servant groups ~Qth their particular systems of control and discipline 
that are different from those mentioned, and which characterize the 
remaining types of discipline and removal technique and thought in 
operation in Massachusett s. These groups combine both the concept of 
protection as characterized by the classified service with the spirit of 
control as indicated in the county government. These studies are the dis-
ciplinary and removal techniques of the police of the Metropolitan District 
Commission, the Boston Police and the state Police of Massachusetts~ 
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CHAPTER 4. 
THE METROPOLITAN DISTRICT COMMISSION 
For the purpose of a uniform control and maintenance of the 
sewerage, parks and water functions of the many cities and towns around 
metropolitan Boston the Metropolitan District Commission was eventually 
established by Massachusetts in 1919. This is a State Commission under 
the control of the state$ At the top it consists of a Commissioner and 
four associate Commissioners who are appointed politically by the Governor 
for definite terms. The Commissioner is empowered subject to the approval 
of the Governor and Council , to appoint a Director for each division in 
chE>.rge of particular v.rork. In accordance with the provisions there 
have been created four divisions: Park Ehgineering, Park Maintenance, 
Water and Sewerage. The Park Engineering, Water and Sewerage Divisions 
are each in charge of a Director who also serves as Chief Engineer of the 
division. The Commissioner also has a police department designed to 
patrol and protect property under the control of the Commission. It 
comprises about two hundred and fifty-five men. At the head is the 
super-intendent. It is broken down into divisions over which are 
captains. Under the divisions are the lesser ranlo;s of superior officers 
down to the patrolman. 
In addition to the police, the non-uniform personnel consisting 
of about one thousand to twelve hundred comprises, broadly, clerical, 
technical and labor groups. As the nature of its functions would readily 
indicate,,it requires the employment of manpower all the v.-ay from common 





The Statute vests the appointing, removing and control o~ all 
and the Secretary, however, are under the civil service laws~ But in the 
matter of control or removal there are t wo distinct procedures . One per-
tains to the police of the connnission only, and the other to all those 
who are not police. Those who are not in the police department are 
regulated by the provisions of Chapter 31 of the Massachusetts Annotated 
Laws, Sections forty- three and forty-five, which has been explained 
before as the strongly protective statute which provides for classified 
servants generP~ly, in the event of contemplated removal, transfer or 
discipline, the rights to a statement of reasons, hearing, cause and 
court review. 
The police in this organization have no right to judicial 
review~ This is expressly stated in Chapter 31, Massachusetts Annotated 
Laws~ Section 45~ Such r ights as the,y have are embraced in Chapter 31, 
Massachusetts Annotated Laws ~ Section 43, which gives them the same 
rights to a ste.t ement of reasons, !iroof of cause, and a hearing before 
the Commi ssioners as accorded the classified servant generally. But here 
it stops, whereas the other non-police members employed by the Commi ssioner 
have a further right to a court review. 
Under Chapter 28, Section 4, the removal and more serious dis-
cipline of the police rests with the Commissioners. Hearings are had 
before them as a full boqy. As provided by Chapter 31, Section 43, a full 
******************** 
1. Massachusetts Annotated Laws, Chapter 28, Section 4e 
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I , 
hearing and right to representation is had~ The policeman is 9ermitt~d 
to introduce witnesses on his behalf and allowed t o cross-examine~ him-
self, or through attorney , the ~~tnesses tastif,Ying against him. 
In ten years thirt een cases against the police were heard by 
the Board. In twelve of the cases there was a finding of guilty. Some 
1 
were discharged but most were suspended. Only ona was exonerated9 
2 Thus the ten year record shows very little chance of vindication once the 
matter is heard within the organization by the Cmmnissioners. Those in 
authority account for this in several ways. In the first place only those 
who are the more flagrant and repeating offenders are brought before the 
Board. The minor difficulties are handled by the local f oreman or divisio 
captain who tries to adjust the problems without the necessity of formal 
action. There is al so avail8ble to the patro~aan and others a procedure 
affording an opportunity to retire, resign, or to transfer by request 
from the divi sion and i t s officers with whom there has been difficulty. 
The authorities therefore explain that with all the efforts 
exerted and wi th this opportuni~J for correcting locally any personnel 
situations it remains that only the incorrigible or those against whom 
many complaints have already accumulated find themselves before the 
Commissioners on the more serious charges. This would seem a reasonable 
explanation of the l arge number of convictions in police discipline. And 
>nth the non-uni f orm personnel the proportion of convictions before t~ 
Commissioners is even greater. In the smne ten year period seventeen 





This ten year 
31 , 1944. 
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None were exonerated. These too are c0nsidered to be only the more 
flagrant and difficult cases, frequently representing either seriou s 
cases or a long histor.y of misbehavior, maki ng a finding af guilty not too 
difficult to procure. 
Most of the cases before the Board , moreover, are either police 
or the unskilled group. In this r espect there is rarely any diffi culty 
with t he skilled or professional personnel ~ To the charge that the 
record of the Board shows undue severity in its discipline ~~thin the 
organization, would be the answer that many more are employ-ed who in the 
interests of public service should ha.ve long ago been up on chargeso The 
fact that foremen or su-per i or officers must appear before a hear i ng and 
be exposed to rigorous and searching examinat ions by lawyers for the 
accused and at the risk of embarrassment b-efore the Commissioners or 
superiors, has restrained the prosecution of many who should have been 
before it. The Commi ssion a_lso feels that justified removals are also 
hampered by the reluctance of f ellow employees to testi :t'y, however unwort , 
the miscreant may be. In the light of these obstructions it would se~ 
likely that more remain in the service of this organization than should be 
rather than the reverse. If ~rthing, the right to hear ing before the 
Commissioners inures to the benefit of the employee. Furthermore , those 
benefits, if anything, may multiply because of the political char a cter of 
the Board. The 1nembers are usually in political life making them sub ject 
to pres&ure, and most frequently in the servant's behalf. 
********************* 
1. Records of the Metropolitan District Commission, Boston , Massy 
(Unclassi fi ed records · n the off ice of the Secretary to the Co · ssio r) 
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Notwi thstanding what appears t o be a balance in his favor I! the 
!police of 
l lation to 
the Met ropolitan Di strict Commission are al so seeking legis-
provide judic i al review of the Board ' s action. 1 This is 
opposed by the heads of the po ice organization who f eel that they are 
more famil i ar wi th the l ocal situation and i n t!le best position to know 
lwhat requires discipline or removal ; that a revi ew of their decisions 
j woul d diminish and impair theil• control over disciplin e re.sul ting in an 
, in ·ury 
I f e low 
to effi ciency of the department . Jl..nd i f there is t rouble t o get 
servants and superiors to testifY before a Board~ it will be all the 
more di ffi cult t o Jrocure vd. tnesses and evidence i f it appears to those 
I 
who must f ur nish it that they must endure the ordeal and embarrassments 
bef ore bot h the Board and the Court. 
I 
******************* 









THE BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENTo 
This organization performing the police functions of the Boston 
area consists of about t wo thousand four hundred and twenty-six policemen 
and superior officers9 At the head of the depar tment is the Police Com-
missi~mer who is appointed politically for a term. Under him the per-
sonnel structure approximates the following: a Superintendent, five 
Deputy SUperintendents, some thirty-one captains in charge of the various 
divisions throughout the city. Under the captains and the officers of 
lower rank are the patrolmen. The police of this city are under civil 
se1~ice. The disciplinary problems in this organization are, broad~y 
speaking, of a minor or major kind. The lesser trangressions which do not 
i nclude moral turpitude, cri me, serious breaches of trust or derelictions 
of duty, are handled and controlled within the divisional structure of 
the department by the captain who is the division head. I n the fi rst 
instance the problems are usually approached by way of talks with the 
officers. This is frequently followed by suggestions, adjustments and an 
attempt t o eliminate sources of tension or friction. Failing this the 
officer has the privilege of requesting transfer and to remove himself 
completely from the atmosphere or people ~~th cwhom he has had difficulty. 
~~en punishment is advisable in the lesser offences it often takes the 
form of the captain placing the officer in a less pleasant beat or vmrk or 
during a less pleasant part of the day, or denies him holiday privileges. 
The imposition of a fine is not permitted. 







offence of gravity or an accumulation of minor repetitions which could not 
be corrected, are not handled with the divisional jurisdiction but referred 
to a central tribunal which is created to deal with the more serious 
charges requiring removal, suspension, transfer or demotione 
The legal basis for handling the disciplinar.1 problems of the 
Boston police relating to removal, suspension, transfer or demotion is 
l 
prescrib·ed by the Massachusetts .Annotated Laws which provides for all 
classified employees the right to notice, hearing and proof of cause. 
Boston, however, within the f orce of thisstatute has worked out its ovm 
unique technique 'rl t hin the organization. It hes created a trial board 
consisting of three captains appointed by the Commissioner. This board 
hears all complaint s coming within the purview of Chapter 31, Section 43e 
The accused has all his rights to present evidence in his behalf and cross 
examine by himself, or by counsel, the witnesses of the prosecution. The 
Commissioner, however, may hear the complaints himself, or having delegate 
or permitted the trial bo1:1rd to judge the case, he reserves the right t o 
review the board's findings a He may modify, affirm, or ignore such f inding' Q 
The usual practice. however, is not to disturb the board's findings . Tbe 
personnel of this board is changed fram time to time and no captain is 
permitted t o sit where a member of his · command is being tried. In the 
event of a guilty finding the punishment has usually been discharge, sus-
pension or extra hours of duty, or bo~h. The findings, subject to affir-
mation by the Commissioner, are final. There is no judicial review as 
2 
provided for the police of other cities in the state. The only review by 
**************************** 
1. Chapter 31, Section 43 
9 setts Annotated Laws Chapter 31 , Secti ons 42A and 42B 
court comes by way of certiorari, which is specifically limited to consid-
era.t ions of legal error in the procedure or decision. The broader consid-
erations inherent in the court review and had by the police of other cities 
is denied the Boston police. 
The Bost on police method of strict disciplinary control of its 
rank and f ile by way of the department's hierarchical apex ·within the 
o~~anization itself and without providing for court review ha s been assaile 
and defended with almost equal vigor. The sentiment of a large nmnber of 
patrobnen and superior officers is that the present procedure is unduly 
severe . Others are of the opinion it is even unjust because i t singles 
them out of all police forces and classified groups in the State (Metropoli an 
District Commission Poli ce and State Police excepted) and denies them the 
right to review. The judicial revi ew for the police force, moreover, has 
1 been energetically sought this year. It has been also support ed by the 
2 
Report of the Special Recess Commissi on Studying Civil Service Laws$ 
3 It has been opposed by the Massachusetts Civic League. 
Those seeking to take away the exclusive power of control had 
by the departmental apex feel that more impartial treatment will be had if 
the hearings are removed from the police atmosphere which, they feel, tends 
. . 
to deliberate too heavily on considerations of duties, not rights, and that 
a court would be more tolerant of and sympathetic with the human frailties 
than the rigid code of the department . Others feel certain judges are kno 
to have an underdog ~pathy for the lesser rank as against the higher . 
*~~******************* 
1. House Bills 341 and 558 of 1945. 
2 . House Do cument 1675 , p . 5. 
3 . The "Lens", February-March issue 1945, of the Ma ssachusetts Civic Leagu , 
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Committee. " ) 
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In any event another chance in a more neutral setting away from the locale 
of disciplinary rigidity or where the reputation or history of the accused 
i s known has had a strong appeal to-many of this group. 
Those supporting reform point out the urgency of change by the 
history of the department's severity both in the extent of punishment and 
in the certainty of conviction before the organization's trial board. 
That both factors appear is supported by the following records of the 
Boston Police Department: 
"Complai nts Against Officers During the Year Ending November 30~1942. 
No. Rank Disposition of Case 
1 Patrolman Guilty; dismissed from Police Department 
1 Patrolman Guilty; suspended for 160 .days and ordered to 
perform 210 hours' punisb...ment duty. 
1 Patrolman Guilty; suspended from duty for 60 days and 
ordered to perform 315 hours' punishment duty. 
1 Patrolman · Guilty; suspended for 50 days and ordered to 
perform 270 hours' punisb...ment duty. 
1 Patrolman Guilty; suspended for 30 days and ordered to 
perform 305 hours' punishment duty. 
1 Patrolman Guilty; suspended for 30 days and ordered to 
perform 70 hours' punishment duty. 
1 Patrolman Guilty; suspended for 15 days and ordered to 
perform 210 hours' punishment duty. 
1 Patrolman Guilt y; suspended for 15 days and ordered to 
perform 105 hours' punishment duty. 
1 Patrolman Guilty; suspended from duty for 15 days. 
1 Patrolman Guilty; suspended for 10 days and ordered to 
perform 210 hours' punishnent duty. 
1 Patrolman Guilty; suspended for 7 days and ordered to 







pisposition of Case 
Gui lty; ordered to pay for equipment lost and 
to perform 105 hours' punishment duty. 
Guilty on first charge; not guilty on second 
charge; ordered to perform 70 hours' punish-
ment duty. 
Guilty; dismissed from Police Department; 
order of dismissal remitted after public heari 
complaint placed on file; suspension lifted. 
Reinstated for purpose of retirement, only6 
Not Guilt,y; complaint dismissed." 1 
And for the record of complaints, findings and dispositions for 
1943 we have: 
~complaints Against Officers During the Year Ending November 30,1943. 
Nature of Complaint 
Conduct unbecoming an officer and dis-
obedience of orders. 
Conduct unbecoming an officer and neg-
lect of duty. 
Conduct unbecoming an officer 
Conduct unbecoming an officer 
Conduct unbecoming an officer 
Conduct unbecoming an officer 
******************** 
Disposition of Case 
Guilty;- dismissed from Police 
Department. 
Guilty; dismissed from Police 
Department. 
Gu-ilty; dismissed from Police 
Department. 
Guilty; suspended for 45 days and 
ordered to perform 315 hours' 
punishment dutye 
Guilty on three specifications 
and not guilty on two specificati ns; 
suspended for 35 days and order-
ed to perform 315 hours' punish-
ment dutye 
Guilty; suspended for 10 days an 
ordered to perform 105 hours' 
punishment duty. 
1. 37th Annual Report of the Police Commissioner for the City of Boston, 










Nature of Complaint 
Neglect of duty and untruthfulness 
Neglect of duty 
Conduct unbecoming an officer and 
neglect of duty 
Failure to take proper care of his 
poli ce department equipment 
Neglect of duty 
Absenc e without leave 
Conduct unbecoming an officer 
Conduct unbecoming an officer and 
neglect of duty 
Disposition of Case 
Guilty; ordered to perform 315 
hours' punishment duty. 
Guilty; ordered to perform 315 
hours' punishment duty. 
Guilty; ordered to perform 210 
hours' p~ishment duty. 
Guilty; ordered to perform 105 
hours' punishment dutyo 
Guilty; ordered to p.erform 105 
hours' punishment duty. 
Resigned while charges were 
pending. 
Not guilty in Suffolk Superior 
Court by jury. Complaint dis-
missed without hearing before 
trial board. 
Not guilty; complaint dismissed. 
officer 11 Conduct unbecoming an Not guilty; complaint dismissed. r 
The report f or 1942 does indicate that of sixteen tried fif- I 
teen were found guilty. ~ro were discharged from the service but those 
suspended were subjected t o further punishment often consisting of many 
hours to be worked out after or in addition to the r~lar day's work. 
The hourly punishment duties imposed ranges all the way from seventy hours 
to three hundred and fifteen, the greater number being more frequently 
inflicted. 
For 1943 sixteen complaints were heard, twelve found guilty, 
******************** 
1. 38th Annual Report of the Police Connllissioner for the City of Boston, 
year ending November 30, 1943. 
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.one resigned and three found not guilty. Here too, the great majority 
were convicted ~~th penalties imposed that can be regarded as heavy con-
sidering the many months and often a year or more required to work out 
these large number of extra hours which have to be done in the officer's 
spare time and usually following his regular day. 
Other reasons advanced for a review are that the.captains on 
the board are not rotated enough, that they are the appointees of a 
political officer, the Commissioner, and subject to his continued in-
fluence were such to be exerted by him for one reason or another; that 
there is a tendency by the Board to convict on lesser evidence than would 
be required if it were knovm that the court has to pass on their delib-
erations. And finally, it is contended that the board composed of captains 
makes neutrality of judgment difficult because all the captains in the 
organization consists of about thirty, and continual interchange of con-
fidences in their common problems between them may often result in the 
facts concerning "troublesome officers" of the division being kno?m 
before the hearing date. 
Such are the weaknesses to the intra- organizational control of 
discipline and removal posed with reference to this organization of some 
two thousand four hundred and twenty-six members. 
There is, however, another side to the ledger - that is the 
view of the higher level in control of the Boston police who support the 
present intra-organizational system ~~th the trial board of captains. 
As in the case of hearings before the full board of the Met-
ropolitan District Comnission, it is felt that more should be brought 
47 
before the trial board than in fact are. Their answer to the charges of 
excessive strictness is that the men who actually reach the stage of pro-
secution before the board are either very serious offenders or those for 
whom the lower divisional authorities have done their best to "straighten 
out" by way of consultation, compromise and even transfer. And that many 
of them have a considerable histo:ry of inefficiency, insubordination or 
misconduct with the divisional level which, but for the "good offices" of 
divisional authorities, so often used in their attempt to avoid trouble, 
would have long since justified a hearing. There is also an extenuation 
to what appears to be a harsh habit of conviction by the trial board. It 
is explained that the suspensions, though accompanied by extra duty, 
could have well been discharges; that the offence or record of the offend-
er most usually warrants discharge but that the lesser judgment of sus-
pension is given to assure the defendant another opportunity and avoid 
the enduring stigma that attaches to a discharges 
The departmental heads of the Boston police feel the trial 
board system has worked ve:ry well; that it places the responsibility for 
maintaining discipline and morale on the shoulders of the superiors and 
control remains ~Qth those who are accountable for the efficiency and 
effective operation of the force. It is further felt that judicial rev iew 
such as is now sought by many in the force would only serve to obstruct 
what they consider to be an effective disciplinary process and that the 
courts would prolong litigation and be in a less favorable positlon to 




THE SI'.ATF. POLICE 
This is a police organization with state vdde jurisdict ion and 
consisting of several "barracksn or branch unit s strategically located in 
various parts of the state. It consists of some three hundred men and 
commissioned officers. At the head of this unit is the Commissioner of 
Public Safety who is appointed to this offi ce politically by t he Governor 
1 
and f or a specific term of f ive years. Subject to the approval of 
the Commissioner, admission to the State Police is by enlistment for a 
2 
three year termQ 
The pattern of or ganization and internal operation follows 
that of the military character. For example, personnel is classified as 
privates , corporals, sergeants, master sergeants, lieutenants, captains, 
et cetera. Like the military, there is the nenlisted personneln and the 
officers and the rules of milit ary courtesy and military manner apply 
in their relationship to each other~ None of the State Police are under 
civil service. 
The exclusive povrer of making rules f or discipline rests with 
the Commissioner , such rules being only subject to approval by the 
3 Governor. 
Consistent ~~t h the military character of the organization, 
the rules of discipline which govern i t have been adopted from the 
Manual of Court Martial of t he United States Army, published ~anuary 1, 
********************** 
1. Massachusett s Annotated Laws, Chapter 22, Section 2. 
2. Massachusetts Annotated Laws , Chapter 22, Section 9A. 
3. Massachusetts Annotated Laws , Chapter 22, Sections 9 and 9A 
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1917. That which would constitute a violation of duty or an offence or 
misconduct in the army would be so similarly considered by this organ-
ization. Moreover, here as in the case of the Boston police , there are 
the minor disciplinary probl ems and those of a more serious nature which 
require formal prosecution. Tbe lesser violations are handled by the 
heads of the local barracks who, in informa l consultation with the 
higher r ank prescribe punishment i f such is thought pr-oper or work out 
adjustments and ch.a.nges if such are deemed best. The most common type of I 
punishment is the imposition of extra duty hours without pay, loss of 
time off, assigmnents to unpleasant or unpopular areas, or tasks. Only 
on rare instances is there prosecution before the Cent r al TribunaL In 
the history of the department's experience all but f'ew disciplinary 
situt:1.tions were 11rorked out v.Ji thin th€ conf'ines of the barracks level. 
In the past three years only one came before a Court Martial and thi s one 
vms dishonourably discharged. 
And where the situation is of such gravity that formal action 
is required , the state police followed the Court Martial system as in use 
by the Uni ted States Pxmy. This provides two types of trial courts. 
First there are the Suw~ary Courts . These have exclusive j urisdiction in 
all cases agai nst enlisted personnel, that isj those below a s econd 
lieutenant. On this court sit commissioned of'fi cers and two non-com-
missioned offi cers. All on this court are assigned by the executive 
officer. The only restraint upon him is that he is not permitted to 
assign one to the court who brought the charge against the a ccused. 
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Secondly, there is the Specie~ Court MartiaL It consists of 
only commissioned officers detailed by the Co~missioner, who may also be a 
member of the Court~ Here also an officer preferring charges cannot sit. I 
~he Special Court de~:ils ex.clusively with offences co~mi tted by conunissione< 
officers. 
The power of either trial court does not impair the par&m.ount 
powers of the Commissioner. ..l\11 findings of these Courts are subject to 
his affirmation, modification or reversal if he so wishes. In practice~ 
it is not the policy of the Commissioner to upset the conclusions of the 
court. Their findings approved by him are finale There is no right to 
court review sove by way of certiorari which, to repeat, limits itself 
narrowly to errors of law and does not provide the policeman a hearing on 
the fact s~ Thus in its basic technique the Stde Police resembles he 
Bos ton Police Department. Essentially it provides f or the direct control 
of its disciplinary matters by the superior ranking off icers wi thin the 
confines of the organization itself. Further» it also places ultimate 
judgment '\IJith the Commissi ·:mer and without the benefit of judicial r eviewe 
But in the composition of the trial tribunal, the State Police differs. 
It should be pointed out that Boston has three capt&ins all of the same 
rank hearing grievances against lower and higher ranking personnel alike, 
whereas the State Police has one board for officers and another for 
enlisted men. Furthermore, the court for the enlisted men has two non-
co~missioned officers in it along with the commissioned men. Thi s ~~s 
presumed to provide democratization and some representation from the 
enlisted ranks in cases involving such. 
Like the Boston Police, there is unimpaired power of control 
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over the men by the higher rank and wi thin the perimeter of State Police 
organization. And this control even seems to become more absolute ~Qth 
this group by virtue of the fac t that the internal operat ion of the 
State Police is characterized by the strict disciplinary atmosphere of 
the military. With the r ank and file there is imposed more of the con-
sciousness of duty and obedience than of rights. 
Like the Boston· system this closely knitted intra-organizations 
control from above has not been without criticism. Its opponents consist-
ing mostly of the lower enlisted ranks, feel that the smallne~s of the 
organization (300 members) makes impartiality, strict neutrality and 
object~vity difficult in such intra-departmental control; that there are 
comparatively only a few officer s in the organization and who by the 
nature of their common interest s exchange notes and informa.tion on their 
local problems which makes it difficult to find officers on a Court 
Martial who have not already either knovm the offender or heard about the 
situation in which he is involved ; the.t there is even embarrassment to 
the officers themselves, many of whom had served some time in the lower 
ranks with the same men appearing as defendants before the bo.ar d; that a 
small officer group living in close contact v,i. th each other does not lend 
itself to individuality of judgment when they sit on court martial matters 
an d t hat because of the i nherent tendency of lower ranking officers in 
the military setting to fol low or obey superiors, the officer personnel of 
the board are exposed to regimented judgment inspired from above. 
Many of t he rank and f ile feel, therefore, that since the 
organization such as t he State Police is small there are drawbacks to the 
. 
system of absolute control by the upper level w.l.thin the ·organization. That 
not only is it apt to bring on excessive rigidity in discipline, but in 
addition it does not provide the neutrality of atmthsphere which the 
accused should have if he is to be judged detached from influences that 
may unf'airly creep into the deliberations by virtue of either knowing the. 
defende~t or about him or because of the advisabi lity of following the 
view o:r upper rank. Hence many state policemen have supported extending 
judicial review to the state police¢ The Special Recess Commission 
. l 
reporting on civil service affairs has recommended it. It is felt 
that the Court would pr6vide a hecring,if such were necessary,free from 
the influences produced by the police atmosphere of the Court Martial. 
On the other hand·, judicial review irs · opposed. and the 
present system is defended by the officers of the top. rank particularly . 
They are of the view that those who join the St~te Police do so volunta.ril;y 
and are informed and have full knowledge of its strict military standards 
of discipline and regulation before doing so. This being so, the 
enlisted state policeman is no more entitled to change the long standing 
traditions or regulations any more than the soldier in the army would be. 
That even though the;r·e .is the characteristic strictness to 'the 
hierarc ical control by those in the su~-e rior rank and the requirement of 
obedience f rom below, there is not warranted the inference that such 
control cannot be just and fair; thnt in fact most of the aberrations of 
the members of this group ere not subjected to any hearings . And any 
member of the department disposed to work and behave in accordance ~~th 
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the department's minimum requirements i s given every assistance in case 
of difficulty even to the point of being permitted to voluntarily transfer 
t o anot her part of the State free from the confl i cts created by the former 
environment. The upper level further contends that the more or less 
absolute personnel control ~~thin the department is only offensive or 
unpopular with those who are not disposed to follow the rules - that the 
efficient and effective servants finds the ~stem agreeable. 
And as in the case of the Boston Police, the defendant that 
does come ~re the Court Martial is involved either in an offence of 
such gravity that adjustment or control in the lower level is impossible, 
or there is a long standing accumulation of lesser misconduct. Eve~Jthing 
i s done to avoid a dishonourable discharge . Defendants are permitted to 
resign before a Court Martial decision is rendered so that the stigma of 
such a di scharge may be avoided. 
Thus aver the proponents of departmental control that the 
system does not offend or oppress the worthy; but it does place the obli-
gation and opportunity for control end regulat i on upon those who are r e s-
ponsible to the people f or an efficient department ; that the review of 
thei r deci sions by the court which is a stranger to the important details 
of the local situation would not contribute t o that efficiencr.y . If any-
thing, the effective process of the department's technique would be 
impaired by time delay and in the event of a modification or reversal of 
the department's decision a serious obstruction in the control of per-
sonnel ~uuld result and those responsible for its effective operation 
would be subject ed. to restraints which only serve t o injure the function-
ing of this important department of public safety. 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
To recapitulate, tersely, the history &nd methods of disciplin-
ar,y control of the public servant in Massachusetts; two periods are closely 
related to this development, one before 1884, the. date of civil serv i ce 
r eform, and the other since that date. 
The earlier period finds the essence, limits and methods of 
disci pline determined by the ordinance or charters of the several towns 
. 1 
and cit i es of the Commonwealth. In the beginning these legal source s 
gave department heads and municipal authorities of the various cities and 
towns what approximated an absolute power in the dismissal of the public 
servant. Later in thi s earlier period mor e restraint upon this power of 
removal was imposed by a number, but not all, of the cities and to~ns 
which provided by l ocal law the requirement of notice, hearing and proof 
of cause as conditi ons precedent t o dismissal. 
The second and later period, which followed the civil servi ce 
r eform of 1884 reveals first, that the formal legislation introducing the 
reforms did not regulate discipline but expres sly left it t o the local 
sources of personnel control; secondly , that the methods of regulation 
and control of the civi l servant were moulded by a series of state 
s t atute& which cut across the l ines of iocal technique. 
The f i rst at t empt at uniform control applies to the veterans 
in the public service who in 1894 were accor ded the r i ght to a heari ng , an 
removal for cause only. From 1894 to 1904 the concept and policy of 
uni formity was supplanted temporarily by the procedure of incorporat i ng 
into the individual state enactment s which brought the ci ties and town 
***~************* 1 . Before 1884 there an ears to be no l aw or s tatute i n Mas&achusetts req 
ing any superior , administrator or department head of State employees to 
perform any conditi ons precedent to discharge . The state employee was sub 
to di scharge at wilL Statuto;t:Y Resear ch of"Public Statutes of Ma ssachuse 
l882-1887"confi rms thi s. --
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groups under the classified s ervice, the provisions of the local law by 
whi ch the particular group had been governed before being classified. 
Then in 1904 followed the enactment of the first state law 
to provide a uniform m€thod of procedure and the first to set fort h a 
series of unvarying conditions that had to be met by removing powers 
before dismissal or discipline could be imposed. This extended to all 
in the classified service of Massachusetts the right t o a hearing, to be 
represented by counsel, to a statement of reasons and proof of cause 
whenever removal, suspension, lowering in rank or transfer against the 
employee's wishes was sought. 
In 1906 the police in the classified service all over the 
· state procured the enactment of a similar statute requiring that those 
seeking to remove or discipline the police by suspension, transfer, or 
lowering in rank shall also provide the servant with the rights to a 
hearing, representation by counsel, statement of reasons and proof of 
cause. 
Following this judicial review was created in 1911. It 
provided all in the clessified service, excepting the police of Boston, 
Metropolitan District Commission and State Police, with the right to 
petition the District Court in their judicial district for a review of 
the action taken by the removing author ities. This was designed with the 
hope of eliminating local abuses that had arisen by virtue of the local 
hearings being held before those who had taken pert in the previous 
deliberations which led to the disciplinary action. It was also deemed 
an added safeguard against arbitrary action due to local political or 
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personal forces. The judicial review legislation directed the Courts to cetermine 
that all formalities were complied with and that the removing authori ties 
I 
1 acted in good faith and f or cause. As a result of this right to seek 
i 
intervention of the Courts, numerous decisions of the administrative 
authorities have been taken to and decided by the Courts. 
And by st~l te legislation in 1923 and 1925 the similar right 
to judicial review was extended to all the classified policeand t o the 
l ( 
correcti0n employees whether classified or not. 
I That this s.ystem of court review is ever growing in appeal to 
I 
the rank and f ile of public employment is borne out by the fact that there 
are at present numerous bills before the Massachunsetts legislature seeking 
I to ·eA."tend this review of the disciplinary decisions of the removing author-
!! !ties to the State Police, Boston Police and Metropolitan District Police. 
II There are also bills by teachers seeking the right to court revi ew of 
l! disciplinary action of school committees; veterans in the public service, 
whether classified or not are also seeking to extend it to disciplinary 
i decisions affecting them. And finally, l egislation is sought t o enable 
I the public servant to go di rectly to the courts~ thereby eliminating all 
Jl control in disciplinary matters by ad.'!linistrative su;>eriors. 
1
\\ 
Further strength is furnished the employees' side by the 
I I decisions of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court making administrative 
I 
officials responsible civilly in damages to the servant for illegal di s-
cipline, demotion o~ removal whether done in good faith or not. 
In addit ion t o the elaborete provisions in the Sta:tuteprotecti 
1 the public servant before and during the disciplinary process this State in 
! more recent years has provided .post discipliner~ legislation designed to 
II 
1' further aid the employee after punishment or dismissal from the classified 
I 
******************** 
l. But see Massa chusetts Annotat ed Lav;s 'J f l 44 , Cha:pt~r 31 , , ec . 45 , um.e 
in ... previous legi s l at ' on FJnd now prov ding that only cl&s ~:; ifi ed serv& t 
in the Department of Correction have such heari ng and reviev.'. 
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missal or punishment to apply to the : Di r ector of Civil Service for 
reinstatement. This is resorted t o very often with approximately f i fty 
percent of the disciplined servants fully reinstated to their former rank 
and position .. 
Turning to those in the Massachusetts Public Service who are 
less shielded by legislatlve armor we find the unclassified of whom the 
county employees are representative, and certs.in police groups who at the 
instant of this ~Titing have only the right to a hearing under the control 
of departmental su:periors within the framework of the organization itself. 
In the county govermnent of Massachusetts we find that the 
civil servant does not come under the provisions of civil service. He 
holds employment at the will of the county political incumbents and can 
be removed without cause or hearing. That the only exceptions to this 
absolute right of removal are the employees of the f i fteen and twenty 
year service groups in the retirement system who are entitled to a hearing 
before a retirement board in the event removal by way of compulsory reti re-, 
ment is sought. From the decision of the retirement board there is also I 
an appeal for this group to the district court~ But we find there are 
serious weaknesses in the service of county government due t o the 
inherent political character of county employment. Such employment being 
exposed t o the absolutism of control by political office holders opens 
the doors to the possible recurrence i n this _state of job selling, 
payments of financial tribute, or other forms of unfair advantage taken 
t o enable county employees to r etain their employment. The county 
s ervant's position, furthe1~ore, is characteristic of all the unclassified 
service in the Commonwealth generally, excepting those, for instance, 
where the local ci ty or town legislation provides safeguards, in that 
th6,1 have no legislation which can aid them in the event of arqitrary or 
unjustified removal or discipline whether due to political or any other 
reason; that there is not only no protection against unwarranted removal, 
but there is extensive evidence of entrenchment not always due to the 
poli cy of reward for efficient service but often due to the failure of 
competing appli cants for county jobs to have the proper or better poli tica ' 
affiliations, thereby denying many competent citizens of the county en I 
equal and f air opportuni ty to compete for county employment; that such 
entrenchment is strongly reflected in the counties of Massachusetts and 
~~ has resulted in little personnel turnover is due in the main to 
the same political party succeeding itself over the long span of years 
in county government. Seeking , to correct the drawbacks in the county 
service ther e has been a history of effort exerted by and in behalf of 
this service to bring the county employees under civil service. At first, 
public spirited organizations of the non-partisan character have presented 
proposals in the 1ffissachusetts legislature seeking civil service status 
for them. The assistance of such organi zations was necessary because of 
the reluctance on the part of the county servants to act for themselves 
due, in a large measure ; to a fear of retaliation by their political 
employers who have consistently resisted the extension of civil service 
to their personnel for the primal~ reason that it would eliminate patron-
age and place restraints upon their absolute control. To date, the 
political heads of county government - have effectively prevented reform. 
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HOwever, at present there is a strong indication that such resistance 
will be defeated and protective measures enacted essentially due to the 
personal appeal of the county servants acting before the legislature 
collectively and for themselves for the f irst time. 
Thus, Massachusetts has developed elabora~e devices to aid 
servants 
certain classified groups and nona at all for numerousjnot classified. 
In between this extensiveness of support on the one hand and complete 
absence of the seJne on the other, are the disciplinary methods of police 
groups where the emploYee or members of the force have rights rooted in 
disciplinary procedure but of a more narrow scope. As characteristic of 
this third method of disciplinary control in Massachusetts, the police 
departments of the City of Boston, the Metropolitan District Commission 
and the St~:tte Police, have been illustrative~ All these retain within 
their respective organizations exclusive jurisdiction over their dis-
ciplinary powers and problems. The members have no right to judicial 
revie·w. This implies that disciplinary personnel functions are handled 
within the organization only. In .the case of the police of the Metro-
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politan District Commission the law provides that the cases involving remcval, 
suspension, transfer or l owBring in rank be heard before the Commissionerf. 
In the Boston Police Department such discipline is heard by the trial 
board consisting of three captains appointed by the head of the depart-
ment. The find~ngs of the Commissioners are f inal as are those of the 
judges of the trial board except that the latter may be modified by the 
Commissioner as head of the Boston Police. The third group illustrative 
of the intre.-departmental control was the state Police. Within this 
organization is set up Court Martial which follows the character and 
milita17 pattern of the United States Army Court Martial. The State 
Police have the summary Cour,t Martial consisting of officers and non-
col!'.missioned officers to hear the more serious complaints against enlistee 
personnel. There is :further, the Special Court Martial consisting of 
officers only, whose function is to hear grievances against officers 
only. The personnel of both courts is determined by the executive officei 
All findings of these courts are· subject to affirmat ion or change by the 
Commissioner of Public Safety v1ho is the department head and whose de-
cision is final in all cases involving discipline. 
Control within the organization and without the benefit of 
court review as reflected by our f indings and studies of these police 
groups reveal that there is greater rigidity in discipline and only on 
rare occasions are the findings of the hearing board anything other than 
gui lty. There is further a split in sentiment in these organizations 
depending of course on whether the individual is of the lower or higher 
ranks. The higher the rank the more likely is the view tbat the more 
absolute control of discipline is necessary to effective and efficient 
operation. In the lower ranks and where the impact of intra-organizationa i 
control would be felt the strongest, there is agitation for a diminuition 
of such exclusive power. This view is manifested in the current pro-
posals of all those organizations for judicial review vrhi: h ,it is f elt , 
will as ::ure the detachment and neutralness of setting not had in hearings 
1 thin the "police" atmosphere of the organization itself where the 
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persona"lities are knov.m or k-nown about. .And in the case of the State 
Police where the total pel·sonnel of officers and men is especially small 
and the officer corps inclined to be intimate» the necessary conditions 
to an impartial and· objective hearing are made all the more difficult. 
In support of intra-departmental control, and opposed to 
judicial review of departmental decisions, we find the upper controlling 
groups of these organizationsw They contend further that such technique 
is not inconsistent with just and fair standards of discipline, and is not 
conducive to excesses in diseipline; that the actual cases requiring 
discipline are treated and adjusted in the lower levels with a vie·w- to 
correcting and helping the members, and with particular stress on elimin-
ating the ~board" hearings if possible; that the hearings are held only 
when the severity or incorrigibility of the case is such that nothing 
more can b-e done ,.vi thout injury to the welfare and efficiency of the 
department. And finally, resistance to the extension of judicial review 
is predicated upon the requirement that the obligation u110n department 
heads to produce an efficient department implies the right and necessity 
to regulate its personnel to that end and any interference with that right 
by weakening the finalit,r of the department 's judgment which, it is felt, 
is the sJurc8) best infonned on matters within it » would serve only to 
inj ure its over-all operation. 
Hence the conflict Of views and interes1E presents us with the 
crux of our problem - the determination of how f ar departmental or removal 
authorities should be vested vnth the power of disciplinary control to 




unequivocal assurance and cons~i ousness that their employment and fUture 
lis not exposed to the whims, the unjust or unintelligent decisions of 
I 
!j departmental superiors. 
li Should there be an absolute control by management i"ree of all 
[! restraint? There are strong reasons which support the negative. The 
jl 
!men and women of today will measure the attractiveness of public employ-
! 
I 
:ment by both the opportunities i t offers f or the future and its security~ 
I 
/The latter implies not merely the assurance of successive pay cheques 
j 
1 but also the assurance that their employment is free from termination 
I 
/at will or by whim; that their employment, in which t hey are expected t o 
lexert l oyal and sincere effort , will not be affected except for reasons I . 
lthat reasonably intelligent men everywher e have come to consider proper 
! . 
' I land necessary. ft~d it would be wrong to assert that all controlling 
\ 
\!authorities in government management are· vested with powers intellectual 
II . and moral to assure us of the application of such reasonsQ Abuses of 
!department al heads such as the scrubwomen and job selling scandals of 
!suffolk County revealed are made possible and profitable to a great 
!extent by the fact that the employment imposed no restraint upon the power 
1
of discharge which made t hi s power susceptable to perversion. Such lack 
of restraint exposes personnel t o risks and harm they should not be f orced 
t o endure and it attaches weaknesses to public employment whi ch impairs 
i ts character and quality in the eyes of t he rank and file. Further, the 
public servant should be judged by the more general economic atmosphere 
in whi ch he lives. It cannot be i gnored that the merits of the public 




advancements enjoyed by those in private employment. And ~~th the progres 
of unions and collective action the freedom from arbitrary action and at 
least the assurance that dismissal will only follow just and proper reason 
has come to be accepted universally as a standard ~d necessary require-
ment of good employment. 
In the public service a sense of practical wisdom didates that 
there is no reason why the servant should be subjected to any lesser 
requirement. Thus the control cannot be wholly free of restraint. It 
must ei'!lbody certain minimum requirements of cause : u~ as a condition 
which 
precedent to discipline/just men have come to r egard as adequate and 
proper. FUrthermore, these restraints would be more effective i£ widely 
publicized as law or rules and knovm by both management and employment. 
I n this way both kno·w the precise behavior expected, and the vvri tten v.rord 
conspicuous to all is substituted for standards of behavior that may not 
be so well knmvn if left unexpressed and to the determination of indi vidua 
management as each ease arises. To avoid t he darkne'SS of conjecture, some 
extend the concept further and prescribe a legal code of behavior and cor-
1 
responding penalties in the public service. 
But our difficulties are not that there should be restraint 
as they are the determinatLm of what that restraint should be consistent 
with efficiency on the one hand, and support ed by the consciousness of' 
personnel of fair treatment on the other$ Massachusetts uniquely offers 
the two extremes. I n our study of the unclassified servant,particularly 
******************** 
l.~~blic Personnel Administration - Mosher and Kinglsey, 1936, pp. 335, 351. 
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the county group~ we have seen the evils attending he public! emplo ent 
upon v1hich there have been no restr eints in matters of cont rol or discharge~ 
We haYe seen that not only does it permit entrance of incompetent and the 
discha r ge of good talent , but even worse, it p ermeates the atmosphere of 
employment -...1th fears of all kinds due to the whim of its tenure which a.re 
indisputa ly destructive to efficiency" A kno¥~n and effective remedy for 
this would be civ·i l service which requi res tbEtt entrance to the service be 
on a merit basis, and at the same time offers protection again~.t arbi tra.ry 
removal or discipline~ 
Turning to the other extreme in our state - that of the tech-
nique of judiciel revi ew which is most exten s i vezy applied throughout our 
l publi c service, we f ind also that there are drawbacks. The extensive 
sheltering given the public personnel by this process is done at the expen se 
of imposi:r.g such restraint upon departmental SU)eriors that the efficiency 
of the service suffers. 
It makes impossible the fi nality of department al j udgment by 
those most f mniliar wi t h local conditions and upon whom rests the res-
· ponsibili ty f or eff iciency and personnel morale. A contr&I'3' or modified 
decision of the courts imposes a course of action or a condition w i h may 
not be for the best welfare of the body; Furthermore, the f act that dis-
cipline can be reviewed ·within the f ramework of extensive legislative 
protection and sub jected to much i ige.ti on gives many pu lie servc..nts a 
f eeling of "rights" and protection tmding to make them less responsive to 
supervision by the authorities in charge sud t o the embarrassmen o such in 
t eir right.ful control of a f fairs. There is f u r ther an impairment of 
*********************** 
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of eff iciency by the airing out that occurs in the process of the trial 
which is fraught ~Qth recriminations, embarrassing and exacting inter-
rogation of superiors and nsides" taken by personnel. It can hardly be 
said that any of this i nures to the benefi t of the department's functioni 
once t he parties return t o their work. 
There is also the element of delay vdth court review. Once an 
1 
appeal is t aken it may take up to two years before a disposition is made 
Thi s keep5 the issue alive and often the obj ect of personnel gossip . for a 
long time . Mor eover, i t prevents the position from being replaced until 
it i s k-nov~whether the court is going t o affirm the deci s ion or reinstate 
the servant. In the meanwhile a number of abs.ent appellants within the 
same department awaiting court r evi ew may place extra burdens upon others 
and prevent adequate replacement for a long time. 
Finally there is the object ion that courts are called upon t o 
deci de matters of special knowledge such. as would be more compet ently 
under s tood by authorities within the department. There are a few illus-
trations in our state where such has been re~uired by the single j ustice 
of the district court~ 2 In"Moore vs the Board of Health of Sprir~field" 
the court ~~s required t o pass upon the physical condition of a kitchen 
3 
attendant. In"Seifen vs O'Hearnn i t had to determi ne the efficiency of 
4 
a bookkeeper. I n"Monae;han v~ Demosi " it had to decide whether a water 
department foreman was discharged for economy~ 
******************* 
1. District Court Rules of Massachusetts 
2. Sprin~field District Court 
5 In Biggins vs Maguire 
3. Thi r d Distri~ourt of Eastern Middlesex, #5004 of 1932 
4. District Coui~ of Chi cop~e 
5. East Boston Di strict~~ 
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t he problem was determini ng whether a hospital super i ntendent was nec-
essary , and in "Denault vs Hammersley" 1 it wa s compell ed to determine 
whether a mechani c had properly lubricated a ma chine . 
I t cannot be disputed t hat such revel at i ons in t he ~rking out 
of the j udicial r eview di s t ort what was intended to be an improvement i n 
the public service to an i mpai rment of it. Granting this to be so, there 
still remains our chief problem to determine what concept s or techniques 
can b worked out f rom t he wisdom of our experi ence in Massachusett s 
to produce somewher e a happy medi um where managem.ent and employ ee in the 
publi c service may attain a sat isfying and working harmony t o the end of 
maximum efficiency. 
Whatever may be devised to create such techni ques and harmony, 
certain steps should be t aken t o eliminate t he weaknesses so apparent i n 
the unclas sified servant s and the over protected personnel. Fir~t , t he 
count and ot her uncl assi f ied servants ~ should be placed under a merit 
ystem, such a s civil servi ce ~ and t hereby rece ve the benefi t s of i ts 
protective provis ons. In additi o steps should be taken t o eli min te 
the excessi ve restr&int s and obstruct ions inherent i n t he ext ensive emp 
legi s l ation and in j udicial review~ 
Direct ing our att ent ion to the consideration of effect i ve 
personnel cont rol , we f ind t hat this ha s of ten taken the f orm of i ntr -
departmental cont rol and the admini ·tre.tive t ri unal not within the depart-
ment . Both appr oaches under par t icul ar circumstan es are j ~1 thin limit s , 





technique or !mother is adopted, certain fundamentals must be rooted in the 
character of the syst em and are seemingly indispensable. First, the 
procedure ¥ whatever it be, must be free from the play of political f orces. 
The V~li'iters Mosher and Kingsley sum it up well: 
"The burden of a proper handling of dis'C'lpUne would_ be 
immeasurably simplified if i t -. ere not for the bedevilment 
of polit icsw " 
A broad step in the lessening of this evil is taken in the 
choice of proper men to sit in judgment. But this is not decisive. There 
are the witnesses and lesser participants who can be "reached" or induced 
to respond a certain way as a result of political intervention and so 
catastrophic can this be to an otherwise meritorious technique that laws 
been 
have/suggested vO expressly prevent, at the risk of penalty, any inter-
ference by politicians or others once the disciplinary process has com-
2 
:menced .. 
Express legi slation to prevent the destructive influence of 
politics is not new. The Hatch Acts of 1939 and 1940 are of the more 
recent endeavours t o curb tb.e "pernicious political activities" in publi c 
ad:mini st rat ion. 
Th~re would seem to be little disagreement that legislation 
designed to eliminate corruptive influence · offers good support and in-
valuable assistance to good and just men sitting in judgment and who are 
trying to determine the truth in disciplinary problems. 
********************** 
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Secondly, the discipline, particularly of the more serious 
vein, affecting the present or future status of the servant must be 
imposed for reasons or causes which just men in all rarucs of the public 
serviceuniverslly have come to acknowledge as :proper and adeq_uate. To 
11 the extent that such reasons and such cause must appear, management by 
I 
I the express import of law should be under restraint. And by the same 
t oken, procedural mechanics to impose discipline supported by such reasons 
must indicate a fair and adequate opportunity to be heard wherever it is 
held. It would seem that nothing less would suffice. Conceding the 
wisdom and necessity of unimpaired control by management, it is not easy 
to expect that degree of efficiency which also flows in a large measure 
from satisfied personnel if the latter are exposed to the experiences of 
working in an atmosi,here fraught vd. th fears, insecurity from unfair 
treatment, and uncertainty of tenure despite worthy and devoted service. 
The third fundamental requires th~ disciplinary problem of 
the more serious kind to be heard or passed upon by impartial men delib-
erating in a neutral atmosphere. Here, too, it would seem that the rank 
and f ile of publi c emplo~!nent would insist as a minimu~ on the requiremen 
that the cause be heard by men in an atmosphere disa ,sso~iated f rom the 
area. of friction. No thing would be more provocative of disrespect or of 
a sense of injustice to personnel -at a hearing than t he consciousness or 
even suspicion that the men sitting in judgment are not free, by virtue 
of their f amiliarity with the parti es or matters, from extraneous in-
f luence which disturb their objectivity and neutrality. 
With these three broad considerations the techniQue adopted 
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should be embodied. In ad:U tion, it is submitted that any new techniques 
tried will depend i'or its ei'i'ectiveness not only upon the prevalence of 
these basic "factors but also upon the size oi' the personnel group to 
which it is to be applied and the nature oi' the issue to be heard . 
Conceding that the greater effic iency results with undisturbe< 
department al control, adherence to the int ra-departmental structure oi' 
disciplinary methods cannot always be worked out satisfactorily except in 
large departments where t he numbers are so great that the partici pants at 
the hearing, whether the,r be ~Qtnesses ~ complainants , defendants, or 
bonrd memb·ers are not "kno~n about" , in other "LAJ'Ords, where there is a 
greater likeliness of impartiality with a prevalence of the neutral 
sitting. 
And conversely the smaller the group the greater is this 
danger of "being knovm about", and the intimacies which prevail in the 
sme.ller group creates the danger of "politics" and makes the probl em or 
\I retaining impartiality and objectivity more di fficult. 
I In our Co~~onwealth, it is submitted that only a f ew depart-
ments of sufficiently large nmnbers exist. The department of Mental 
Health vdth about three thousand employees, the department of Public Workf 
wit h about three thousand employees, and the Metropolitan Di strict Com-
mission with f ifteen hundred employees , are the except ions. With the 
exception of the cities of Springfield and Worcester, with Public Works 
Departments of about one thousand,each of the numerous departments of 
our cities and towns have much smaller personnel groups down to a mere 
handful. 
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Thus it would seem that there would be difficulties working 
out everywhere a strict intra-departmental control with the same e:f'fectiv 
nes s possible in the larger groups, and to overcome the drawbacks inheren 
in the smaller departments, we have the alternative of the administrative 
tribunal designed to se1~e the combination of numerous departments~ 
Because it ·will then ser-ve thousands, there should be greater as&urance 
and opportunity of procuring men of impartial judgment and di sconnected 
from the locale or people in issue. 
Furthermore, t be tribunal is made more effective if the men 
chosen to sit on it combine not only a capacity for the "legal" under-
standing of things» but also offer learning and life's experiences in 
the more pertinent fields of personnel, public administration and in the 
subj~ct matter in issue before it. 
Such men sitting in judgment are indispensable whether it be 
within the departn1ent or wi thin a. more consolidated jurisdiction served 
by the administre,tive tribunal. 
And if these men are permitted to deliberate free from the 
disturbing forces of influence or politics, free from the fears of tenure 
insecurity, they can infuse the process and systems of discipline ~~th 
that blend of integrity and wisdom wbich will eliminate the destructive 
influence of politics or excessive protection :provided by our judicial 
review and yet assure the public service of even-handed justice and of 
security from arbitrary treatment to the end that the :paramount consid-
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